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Preface 
To restore his health, American philosopher Josiah Royce 
sailed around the world in mid-1888. He reported achieving 
significant philosophical growth while voyaging "down un-
der" in the South Seas. To investigate this report, the present 
study tries to measure Royce's growth in metaphysics, ethics, 
and sociopolitical thought during his sojourn in Australasia. 
Thus the title, "Royce's Voyage Down Under," includes 
several levels of meaning: geographical, psychological, and 
philosophical. When Royce began his 1888 trip to Australia, 
he was "down under" psychologically. But soon he pen-
etrated down under his previous depths of thought and 
gained a central insight that radiated into the broadest ranges 
of his thought. To set this insight of 1888 into the context 
the present study calls for, a survey ofRoyce's overall intellec-
tual development may prove helpful. 
Josiah Royce was born of pioneer parents in 1855 at Grass 
Valley, California. When, as a young boy, Josiah strolled 
amid the scenes of this mining town in the Sierra Nevada, he 
already was pondering the meaning of human history, life, 
and death.1 Before graduating from the University of Califor-
nia at Berkeley in 1875, he had so steeped himself in contem-
porary British thinkers that he confessed of his undergrad-
uate years, "I became through Uohn Stuart] Mill's influence 
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a decidedly sceptical critical empiricist. "2 During the next 
seven years (1875-1882), though mentally still sloshing 
around in the swamp of sceptical empiricism, this youthful, 
largely self-made philosopher strove by his careful, persever-
ing researches to reach a sound theory of knowledge. 
His earnest pursuit of philosophy took him to Germany 
for a year of study under several outstanding professors and 
then to America's first graduate school for two more years of 
philosophical investigation at the Johns Hopkins University 
in Baltimore. For his doctoral dissertation Royce scrutinized 
precisely what we do when we make true judgments. Then 
serving as an instructor in English back at Berkeley from 1878 
to 1882, Royce invested his private hours in insistently more 
critical investigations of the knowing self. He analyzed how 
in each present experience the self generates meaning by its 
unavoidable "postulates" of a past and a future. Answering a 
call to Harvard in the fall of 1882, Royce nurtured this invita-
tion into a thirty-three-year career of teaching philosophy. 
During his second semester at Harvard-in the spring of 
1883-Royce finally broke through to his fundamental "reli-
gious insight. "3 This freed him from his "earlier sceptical po-
sition" and gave his mind that definitive orientation in 
which it persisted during all the subsequent transformations 
in the scope, manner, and spirit of his thought.4 Shortly be-
fore his death in 1916, Royce looked back upon these early 
crises and declared that the years "1875 to 1883 determined 
my philosophical thinking." 5 
Because he estimated his religious insight as the basic 
light constituting his own philosophy, it seems necessary to 
distinguish between his "preformed" period (before 1883) 
and his "formed" period (after 1882). By this distinction I 
mean to indicate whether or not his "religious insight" was 
at work. Even as late as 1916, however, Royce's mind had not 
yet reached that wholeness of vision he had always sought. 
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But by then, a wiser Royce was much more modest, fallible, 
and ready to admit his limitations. 
In brief, then, I view Royce's intellectual development as 
characterized chiefly by three maximal insights, which oc-
curred in the pivotal years of 1883, 1896, and 1912.6 These 
insights stimulated transformative reinterpretations of 
Royce's own thought and amounted to distinct additions to 
his former position. Yet the three resultant "changes of 
state" were at their vital central core sufficiently coherent to 
preserve the radical unity of his idealism. Thus in some first 
groping comparisons, one can liken the thought growth of 
Royce's "formed" period to the changes of state which an 
H 20 molecule undergoes when under heat it passes from ice, 
through water, to steam, or to the three growth stages of a 
butterfly which develops as a single self-identical, living real-
ity from fertilized larva, through cocooned pupa, to adult 
four-winged organism. 
Before each of these critical points of further penetration, 
Royce encountered a gradual cumulation of challenges, in-
sights of minor or medium intensity, further criticisms, and 
increasing pressures. To each of these Royce responded 
through his commitment to seek more truth by breaking 
through in 1883 to the distinctively "new light" of the all-
knowing Judge; in 1896, to the self-constituting, unavoid-
ably social, Absolute Individual; and in 1912, to Reality as a 
Community oflnterpretation, thanks to his realistic synthesis 
of hints drawn from the apostle Paul and the American logi-
. cian, Charles Sanders Peirce. After each of these maximal in-
sights, Royce's mind strove to reorganize his previous 
thought by reinterpreting all of it in terms of his latest "new 
growth." And the result each time was a synthesis, concrete-
ness, tone, and expansion which were new. 
On the basis of these three maximal insights, then, I dif-
ferentiate his thirty-three years as a philosopher at Harvard 
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into three subperiods: the early Harvard Royce (1883-1895), 
the middle Royce (1896-1911), and the mature Royce (1912-
1916). Serious consequences flow from this way of dividing 
his thought growth but I believe the division is determined 
more by signals that Royce himself left about his philosoph-
ical pilgrimage than by my own doing. 
More specifically, Royce's 1883 "religious insight" con-
sisted in his finding enough evidence to abandon his former 
sceptical empiricism and its conseqent total ethical relativ-
ism. By fittingly and profoundly reflecting on his questions 
in theory of knowledge, in ethics, and in religion, he finally 
broke through to certain irreversible insights ("absolute 
truths") about the possibility of logical, ethical, and religious 
error. Coming to a peak in early 1883, these reflections 
opened upon an all-knowing Thought, discovered existen-
tially present in the knowledge of error as error. Royce viewed 
his argument for this as "essentially altered" from that of his 
previous mode of thinking. 7 This breakthrough stemmed 
from what Royce called "the decided reversal" of his view 
about his postulates.8 For these could not even be erroneous 
except within a community of knowers integrated by an All-
Knower. 
This intellectual penetration of 1883 needs to be seen 
within the matrix that helped form it. Royce's seven previous 
years of philosophical research into the theory of knowledge 
had accustomed him to "rather insistent self-criticism." Par-
ticularly during the last four years in his then philosophically 
barren California (1878-1882), he had sharpened his critical-
ity by scrutinizing the basic structures of his consciousness. 
His Berkeley studies of "old Father Kant" had honed his un-
derstanding of the three Cn"tiques, expecially Kant's notion 
of the kingdon of ends. Royce's intellectual reflections had 
already led him to experience intuitively that "beings with 
minds" cannot authentically intend the unending disharmo-
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ny of all moral agents. Because every attempt to deny this in-
tent to harmony simply reinstates it, Royce viewed this in-
sight as irreversible and expressive of an invariant "internal 
meaning" in the self. At its innermost core this "internal 
meaning" constantly intends to promote, in and through 
every choice, a universal community of all moral agents. 
With his move to Harvard in 1882, Royce's mental envi-
ronment also changed. He found himself among intellectual-
ly more stimulating colleagues who did not automatically 
reject such thinking as "metaphysical daydreaming." Rather 
they challenged him to provide rational grounds for his the-
ory. Moreover, some Harvard students asked him for guid-
ance in their problems with life.9 Upon discovering his moral 
and religious insights, Royce thought he could give such 
guidance. He grounded iL on the community of human 
truth-seekers, cointended by a superhuman all-knowing 
Judge, its Norm. During the following decade (1883-1892), 
this idea of community guided Royce's works in history, the 
novel, and social psychology, as well as that highly organized 
philosophical idealism he expressed in the latter part of his 
Spirit of Modern Philosophy (1892). Royce's growth during 
his 1888 health cruise to Australia-the focus of the work at 
hand-occurred in the middle of this decade and resulted in 
a medium-range insight that injected new life and power in-
to Royce's philosophizing. 
By 1892, however, Royce's mind was already moving to-
ward his second major penetration, his insight into what we 
mean by the individual. Already in 1891, a cue from logician 
Ernst Schroeder led Royce to see that whether one's meta-
physical interpretation of the world be "realistic" (read 
"materialistic" and "agnostic") or "idealistic" (read "spirit-
centered" and "theistic"), one's ultimate meaning ofReality 
could only be defined in terms of self-reflective individual 
elements which are serially, socially, and unendingly bound 
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in unity.10 Then from 1893 onwards, he was for several years 
strongly influenced by Francis H. Bradley's Appearance and 
Reality, as he later acknowledged. u But it was G. H. 
Howison who, perhaps even more than Schroeder or Bradley, 
jarred Royce into taking individuals seriously and into pre-
serving human individuals from being absorbed by the Abso-
lute. For during and after the famous 1895 "Conception of 
God" discussion at Berkeley, Howison fired enough shafts 
into Royce's at first loosely fastened armor that Royce was 
driven to search for a philosophically more adequate defini-
tion of the individual.12 In his early-1896 Augustus Graham 
Lectures, Royce made what was, to my knowledge, the first 
public mention of his new penetration to the individual as 
"the object of exclusive interest." He arrived at this insight 
differently than he had done in 1883. For in the earlier year 
he had proceeded from a finite, erring, human self to an All-
Knower. But in 1896 he argued from the freely self-constitut-
ing Absolute Individual to the finite imitations of this indi-
vidualizing way of constituting a self. 
Royce found this theory of individuality "unexpected" 
and "startlingly original."B Fortunately, several events then 
occurred which let Royce organize this "new light" and sys-
tematize his thought to the utmost. Challenged by the invi-
tation to present the Gifford Lectures, Royce invested his 
consummate metaphysical energies in the writing of The 
World and the Individual. In the spring of 1898, he drank in 
C. S. Peirce's Cambridge Lectures entitled "Reasoning and 
the Logic of Things." Three years later, Royce in retrospect 
disclosed to William James, "[Those Peirce lectures] 
... will always remain epoch-marking for me. They started 
me on such new tracks." 14 Then late in 1899, having agreed 
to offer the Ingersoll Lecture on Immortality, Royce in it pro-
foundly analyzed what we mean by an individual, using only 
the close of the lecture to draw out the implications for im-
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mortality. Royce's middle-period synthesis revealed not only 
Peirce's emphasis on logic and his "epoch-marking" ideas, 
but also Royce's own originality, which was shown, for exam-
ple, in his view of the self as a "dynamo of ideas." Putting 
his insight of the serially self-constituting individual to work, 
Royce plowed into a direct examination of "life and life 
problems." Furthermore, in his 1901-1911 researches in 
logic, human truth, immortality, and illusions affecting race 
relations he almost explicitly formulated his latent awareness 
that the self has its teleological identity in the Beloved Com-
munity. In his Philosophy of Loyalty (1908), he did become 
explicitly aware of this and made it the heart and lifeblood of 
his ethics and metaphysics. 
Coming to the third and final stage of Royce's thought 
growth, we sense that its expanse and wealth deserve a full-
length study. Royce compared this "new growth" of 1912 to 
that kind of "unexpected" transformation in thought which 
he had experienced in 1883 when he passed from agnostic 
empiricism to theistic idealism. 15 We need not force this 
comparison by Royce into an admission that in 1912 his basic 
view was "essentially altered," as was the case in his 1883 
breakthrough. But 1912 certainly marked a radical reinter-
pretation of his former ideas, a "distinct addition to my for-
mer position, a new attainment," as Royce appraised it. 16 
Although his 1912 apoplexy temporarily restrained his 
bodily movements, it seems only to have occasioned a new 
setting of directions for his mental energies. It did mean 
abandoning his dream of producing a masterwork in logic. 
However, Royce's temporary freedom from teaching allowed 
him to restudy C. S. Peirce's thought more carefully. He also 
reassessed the apostle Paul and Christianity as no other "clas-
sic" American philosopher had ever done. Little wonder, 
then, that this 1912-1916 period of his authentic maturity in 
thought is marked by the phrases "Community of Inter-
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pretation" and "life in the Spirit." These are clues of his 
deepened grasp of Peirce and Paul, working to appreciate 
more accurately the essence of the Christian creed, published 
in his mature masterpiece, The Problem of Christianity 
(1913). 
Soon Royce carefully and explicitly described how he had 
recently and radically transformed his own theory of knowl-
edge.17 He had removed it from a subject-object basis and 
fitted it on the triadic relation of what he called technically a 
"Community of Interpretation." By doing this he found his 
philosophy becoming more concrete and meaningful. He 
also found it relating anew to inductive science's presupposi-
tions and methods. What Royce had no need to mention 
here, since he had clearly stated it in his Problem of Chn's-
tianity, was that this new concreteness, significance, and 
closeness to science came about through a new kind of im-
mersion into the psychosocial order of time. This immersion 
avoided becoming a plunge into James's stream of merely 
casual continuities because, beyond mere tychism, Royce in 
his musing had detected that the teleology of a spiritual pro-
cess unites finite minds and an inmost synchronological In-
terpreter in mutual presence and interaction. 
In resume, it seems oversimplified to depict Royce's over-
all thought growth merely as a straight-arrow emergence of 
the idea of the community. Rather, his intellectual develop-
ment seems to show three ideas arising to explicit form, each 
in its own time and way. These were the ideas of community, 
individual, and Spirit, each intending its real counterpart at 
work within the world's universal Process of Interpretation. 
The idea of community (of human and superhuman coin-
tenders and cointentions) was clearly present to Royce in the 
moral and religious insights of his early Harvard days. Yet 
through the subsequent decades his continuous social ap-
proach to philosophy lifted this idea to a new prominence. 
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Finally, his 1912 "breakthrough" to Peirce's distinctive 
philosophical method of interpretative musing brought the 
idea of community to center stage. The second central idea to 
emerge into explicit articulation was that of the individual. 
Surfacing definitively in 1896, it was later purified in many 
ways. This idea was socially defined, serially realized, and in-
finitely durational. The constructive work of Royce's middle 
period-especially as found in The World and the Individ-
ual-resembles a cocoon around this pupa of the individual. 
Finally, the idea of Spirit, often foreshadowed, began to 
show itself clearly when Royce studied loyalty .18 Once Royce 
drew clues for his philosophy of religion from the vital ideas 
of Christianity, the presence of the idea of Spirit became per-
vasive. He presented the Spirit as a living bond of individual 
and the community, and as the Great Interpreter who medi-
ates between participating members and their communities. 
After this sketch of Royce's intellectual growth during 
more than four decades (1875-1916), the reader may wonder 
why in the present study we concentrate on merely a half year 
of Royce's life. Are not several competent overall surveys of 
his thought growth already available? 19 Are not full-length 
intellectual biographies of Royce in the making? 20 True 
enough. But the present investigation of Royce's intellectual 
development in 1888 is both timely and worthwhile because 
of at least four concurring facts. 
First, only in his Australasian writings did Royce allow 
himself any major expression of his sociopolitical views. This 
fact alone makes his reflections on his 1888 experience partic-
ularly significant and deserving of study. Second, many in-
terested in the history of American thought incline to the 
view that Royce became conscious of his loyalty doctrine only 
shortly before 1907 when he published his widely read Phi-
losophy of Loyalty. But his Australasian writings show that 
Royce had already formed a rather well developed philosophy 
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of loyalty almost two decades earlier. Third, the 1888 Royce 
discovered the significance of the appeal-and-response dyna-
mism in community and founded his doctrine of loyalty on 
this transactional basis.21 Most of all, however, if exception is 
made of Royce's logical interest, this Australian interlude 
manifests his wholeness in personality and in philosophy. 
Hence, an investigation of the 1888 Royce allows us to inte-
grate the many facets of Royce the man and the thinker and 
to transcend a one-dimensional approach which so many 
studies have been compelled to take. These four facts, then, 
call for a concentrated investigation of Royce's intellectual 
growth during his brief visit to Australasia. 
Ironically, Royce's 1888 insight into community arose 
precisely when he was removed from the highly intellectual 
and competitive communities of Harvard University, its phi-
losophy department, and his own family, and was thrust first 
into solitude and then into nonacademic associations with his 
ship's captain and crew, with politicians and their parties, 
and with primitive Maoris and an Australian backwoodsman. 
Plunged into the vital interaction between elemental nature 
and his own organism, into the simple direct life of the crew, 
politicians, and primitives, and into the divine presence, 
Royce was rescued from his own abstractions and from Har-
vard's rarefied academic atmosphere. 22 Ironically, too, 
Royce's insight into loyalty as the vital center of community 
was occasioned by his lack of concern for his own health and 
thus by his disloyalty toward himself, his family, and his uni-
versity. A third irony was that some of his readers branded 
him a disloyal American when his insight into loyalty led 
him frankly to expose the shortcomings of the widespread 
view that any genuine American is against the government, 
community organizations, and big institutions. 
The theme unifying the present work is Royce's whole-
ness of multifaceted personality and of philosophically com-
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plex-yet-simple mind. The central idea integrating his philo-
sophical wholeness is community-that same idea of com-
munity which Royce in the final year of his life acknowledged 
had risen only gradually to consciousness at the center of his 
intellectual development.23 Moved by the political and non-
political social experiences of his voyage of 1888, Royce 
focused on the idea of loyalty as the heart of his idea of com-
munity. With the aid of his earlier "religious insight," he 
grasped intellectually that the life of genuine loyalty is pos-
sible only if one possesses a vital bond with the universal 
community and with its Infinite Alter Ego. 24 In Royce's 
metaphysical insight of 1888, he recognized that within this 
wholesome community any self s appreciative knowing of re-
ality must be given primacy over the self s freedom and activ-
ity if the self is to attain integrated wholeness. Recognizing 
further that it is self-contradictory and thus absurd for any fi-
nite knower as such, or any community of finite knowers as 
such, to claim that its knowing is complete and genuine, 
Royce asserted the actuality of the Infinite Self and All-
Knower as a necessary condition for any genuine finite know-
ing. In this way he developed his metaphysical insight into a 
systematic wholeness. 
This speculative system, though needed, was inadequate 
for Royce, since human selves are also called to dedicated 
service of their communities and causes. This loyal service re-
quires wise practical attitudes, criteria for discerning prior-
ities, and the guidance of sane maxims-all of which Royce 
began to formulate in his 1888 philosophy of loyalty. Upon 
this practical basis he constructed his only systematic inter-
pretation of an integral sociopolitical philosophy. The link-
ages between Royce's metaphysical, ethical, and sociopolit-
ical thought bound the doctrinal content just surveyed into a 
whole system centered in the idea of community as enlivened 
by the idea of loyalty. 
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But the wholeness of Royce's 1888 philosophy also in-
cludes his philosophical method. Earlier he had pledged 
himself to philosophize "earnestly, independently, and rev-
erently. "25 In 1888 Royce mused in just this way over the 
materials he sought to interpret-something the reader will 
understand by a kind of mental symbiosis if he here accom-
panies Royce on his philosophical reflections while "down 
under." At that period Royce had not yet reflexively formu-
lated his philosophical method into a methodology. (His 
1912 insight into C. S. Peirce's way of reasoning would en-
able him to do so later.)26 But by entering into Royce's efforts 
to straighten out "the big metaphysical tangle about conti-
nuity, freedom, and the world-formula, which, as you 
remember, I had aboard with me when I started," and by 
following Royce's moves to weave these strands into a coher-
ent fabric, the reader will analyze and synthesize with Royce 
as he fashions the tapestry of his 1888 thought.27 The reader 
may also perceive how Royce's integrated personality sup-
ported all these philosophical endeavors and collaborated 
with them-whether Royce functioned as a patient aboard 
ship, as a conversationalist, as a hiker in the Blue Mountains, 
as a political student, as a son and brother, or as a dedicated 
member of Harvard's philosophy department writing to his 
friend and colleague, William) ames. 
Acknowledgements are here made to those who per-
mitted me to publish from Royce's manuscripts: the heirs of 
the Josiah Royce family and Richard Hocking; and to the fol-
lowing institutions that have made the present study possible 
by publishing Royce's writings or preserving them for re-
search: Atlantic Monthly; George Braziller; Clark University 
Press; Houghton Mifflin; Little, Brown; Macmillan; Scrib-
ners; and the University of Chicago Press; along with Ban-
croft Library of the University of California; Boston Public 
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Library; Harvard University Archives; Houghton, Robbins, 
and Widener Libraries of Harvard University; Johns Hopkins 
University Library; National Library of Australia; and Yale 
University Library. 
In concluding this preface, I wish to thank every person 
who helped me with this work-most of all, Professor David 
J. Hassel, S.J., without whose encouragement, patience, and 
gentle but persistent prodding this book would never have 
been brought to birth. Of the many others who contributed 
to this study, I must mention Professors John Clendenning, 
John E. Smith, and Richard Robin because their support, cri-
tiques, and suggestions made this investigation possible. I 
am particularly indebted to my fellow Jesuits of Xavier Uni-
versity, especially Robert W. Schmidt and the late Thomas 
G. Savage, for their editorial assistance, and to Mrs. Eunice 
Staples for her outstanding secretarial skills. For the opinions 
expressed here, however, and for the imperfections still re-
maining, I must assume the responsibility. 
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1 
Introduction 
In the spring of 1888, William James wrote from Harvard to 
George Santayana studying in Berlin: "Royce (broken down 
at last) is on his way to Australia. But he'll be as stout as ever 
next year. "1 James's forecast was accurate. Early in 1888,Josi-
ah Royce (1855-1916), American philosopher of community, 
was exhausted. His doctor advised him to sail leisurely and 
alone to Australia. Royce took the three-month cruise from 
Boston to Melbourne, then enjoyed the natural beauty of 
Australia and New Zealand for two more months, and finally 
returned by way of California to Harvard for the autumn 
term of1888.2 
On his voyage certain events occurred that advanced 
Royce's intellectual development significantly. To give bal-
ance to our study it should be stated at once that on his Aus-
tralian trip Royce did not grow intellectually as much as he 
did through his transformative insights of 1883, 1896, and 
1912. 3 For these latter three were respectively the seeds of 
The Religious Aspect of Philosophy, of his revised version of 
The Conception of God, and of The Problem ofChn'stianity. 
Yet when Royce ended his 1888 trip, he knew that he 
brought back to Cambridge more than simply a body and 
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mind refreshed by a long vacation at sea. He was convinced 
that during this trip he had "bagged new game" philosoph-
ically. Hence he was eager to share it.4 Before landing in Aus-
tralia, he had written William James: "In fine, I have largely 
straightened out the big metaphysical tangle about continu-
ity, freedom, and the world-formula, which, as you remem-
ber, I had aboard with me when I started, and I am ready to 
amuse you with a metaphysical speculation of a very simple, 
but, as now seems to me, of a very expansive nature, which 
does more to make the dry bones of my "Universal Thought" 
live than any prophesying that I have heretofore had the for-
tune to do." 5 This tantalizing news made William James 
reply, "I shall 'admire' to hear your final solution of the 
antinomies, and am eager deswegen [on that account] for 
your return."6 Precisely what had occurred in Royce's 
thought during his 1888 sojourn? This question focuses the 
central aim of the present study. 
For his recuperation the doctor had prescribed simply 
that he live alone on a sailing shipJ Yet Royce regained his 
health, thanks not only to his solitary union with nature but 
also to his communion with people, aboard and ashore. Was 
it this blending of creative solitude and stimulating dialogue 
within his mind that "largely straightened out the big meta-
physical tangle about continuity, freedom, and the world-
formula" ? The question suggests a twofold approach to 
Royce through his solitary reflections and through his social 
relations during this Australian cruise. 
According to Milton R. Konvitz's description, Royce's 
mind was "trying to control a bursting complexity of 
thought." 8 Even before his voyage to Australia, during a 
dozen years he had already nourished his philosophy from 
roots that were affective and aesthetic, conative and creative, 
as well as logical and rational, although it was to this last 
mentioned pair that his published work had directed more 
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attention. To understand Royce adequately, then, we first 
need to acquaint ourselves with the many different functions 
he fulfilled during his 1888 sojourn, functions that reflect his 
many-sided personality. Such a strategy will bring us in line 
with the standard Royce set for anyone aiming to grasp his 
philosophy: namely, an understanding of Royce's own 
"essential temperament" as the unique determinant of his 
philosophizing. 9 
Even if we lack that "whole of the longer story" he wrote 
to his wife about his South Sea experience, what do the avail-
able letters from the trip and his written reflections on it 
suggest concerning his personality and temperament?10 As a 
correspondent, Royce is frank, humorous, and noticeably 
self-revealing. As a patient, he is keenly alert to the "turns of 
weather" that his psyche undergoes during his convalescence. 
As a sensitive perceiver both of nature and of his own affec-
tive responses to it, he reveals how major changes of one's 
natural setting induce altered states of consciousness. As a 
fellow companion or hiker, he shows himself to be an artist of 
dialogue, a man of many lively interests, and a guest who is 
humanly flexible. Moreover, he is an insightful student of 
men and of their political systems. Along such general lines, 
we can in the first part of this study gain a closer acquaint-
ance with the affective and volitional sides of his personality. 
Under this set of sails, we can launch out next to fathom 
directly the intellectual depths he reached on his 1888 
voyage. Our questions will then become: 1) In his solitary 
reflection, what discovery caused his new "metaphysical spec-
ulation"? 2) What deeper moral insight helped him better 
understand his ethical "question about Freedom and the 
Ideals"? 3) How did his new social relations stimulate a social 
and political philosophy given little expression until then? 
What method guides our investigation in this second part 
of the study? Through textual analysis we assemble the avail-
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able clues that Royce left of his intellectual growth in 1888, 
while keeping his first sketch and his marginalia on Mar-
tineau in subordinate positions. Then in the final part of the 
study we test our reading of these clues against a later, key, 
Roycean insight, against two of his leading philosophical 
works produced shortly after his return, and against the total 
context of his life's intellectual development. 
In contradiction of our present aim and method, some 
objections readily arise. For example, it might be said that in-
sights do not usually occur on health cruises. And if the 
marginalia on Martineau do stem from Royce's depressed 
period, it might be argued that they may not be used even as 
subordinate evidence. In briefest response here, it can be said 
that great minds often make key discoveries when relaxed 
after toil. 11 Secondly, intrinsic and extrinsic evidence suggests 
a postdepression dating of Royce's marginalia on Martineau, 







Since his 1882 start at Harvard, Royce had passionately de-
sired to succeed there. Psychologically his 1888 breakdown 
stemmed from his drive to become an accepted philosophical 
colleague within a prestigious department and from his am-
bition to win a full professorship eventually. In the begin-
ning, he had to invest three years of demanding teaching to 
steady his first perilous perch in the department. Then, in 
addition to carrying out as an assistant professor of philos-
ophy his full instructional duties of teaching fifteen to eigh-
teen hours weekly at Harvard and at the Society for the 
Collegiate Instruction for Women (the future Radcliffe), he 
simultaneously saw through publication his first major philo-
sophical work, his first volume in history and character study, 
and his first novel.1 These protracted pressures took their toll. 
Royce was stout, but not superhuman. He doggedly pushed 
himself into the first semester of 1887-1888, and completed 
it. But on February 9, 1888, he confided to Daniel Coit Gil-
man, the guide of his intellectual life: "The breakdown is 
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nervous of course and needs nothing, I am assured, but a 
long sea voyage all alone, to make me myself again .... I 
feel nearly all the time very well and nobody meeting me on 
the street would call me ill, but the little devil in the brain is 
there all the same, and this kind goeth not out but by travel-
ings and hard fare. "2 That spring, the Harvard Corporation 
granted Royce a leave of absence at half pay. He indicated to 
Gilman that a "very dear friend" was financing the trip and 
insuring the safety and comfort of his family during his ab-
sence. Signs point to the ever-faithful Charles Rockwell Lan-
man as this friend, who also gifted Royce with smoking 
pipes, a three-month supply of tobacco, and a set of informa-
tive ocean charts. 3 
Others helped, too. George Herbert Palmer influenced 
President Eliot of Harvard to secure the services of that inde-
pendent philosopher Francis Ellingwood Abbot. The latter 
would carry on Royce's advanced course in the philosophy of 
nature but in his distinctively non-Roycean way.4 William 
James thoughtfully provided mineral water, figs, and some 
French novels. Serving as Josiah's secretary, his wife Kath-
arine penned needed letters, assisted with the packing, and 
helped gather reading materials for the trip. Besides the 
French novels these included Cassanova's memoirs, some 
books in mathematics and mechanics, and, yes, those gift 
volumes of A Study of Religion just received from James 
Martineau in England.5 Royce had an Australian acquaint-
ance, Richard Hodgson, secretary of the American Society for 
Psychical Research, who provided him with introductions to 
friends in Australia.6 Someone arranged passage with Cap-
tain Howes of the Freeman. And soon all was ready. 
After two days of delay, the square-rigged Freeman final-
ly weighed anchor from Boston on February 27. Lanman re-
corded that an awful storm tore at the sails of this bark as it 
faded out of sight and beyond Boston light into the wintry 
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North Atlantic trying to reach the more peaceful sum-
mertime of the southern seas. Just as perilously perched as 
the Freeman was its invalid passenger, since Royce was 
undergoing the crucial test whether his psyche could actually 
survive its run-down condition and regain its full vigor. His 
trial lasted longer than that of his ship. For soon it en-
countered twelve weeks of fair weather so that it sailed 
leisurely into the South Atlantic, down to the Cape of Good 
Hope, and then straight through the Indian Ocean towards 
Melbourne, the capital of Victoria. Meanwhile Royce was 
undergoing what he had expected: "a long siege of dull 
spirits at the outset of the voyage." 7 Despite his "head-
weariness" at the start of the voyage, Royce's wits would whir 
on mechanically. But his emotions were dull and motionless, 
due to his "overtaxed nerves . . . uncomplicated by any 
organic or other deep trouble." Fortunately, Royce was his 
own best analyst and knew that his long period of depression, 
if wisely handled, would be turned into part of an "experi-
ence . . . in many ways highly educating." 8 To William 
James he described his flattened state as not strong enough to 
be called "misery," even as he told of his cure: 
It was an absolute negation of all active predicates of the emotional 
sort save a certain (not exactly "fearful") looking-for of judgment 
and fiery indignation. -But all this pathology is no longer in 
order. With the winds and the birds of the southern sea came a new 
life .... And now that passion has come again, and the good Lord 
seems to have some life in his world of "Sonnen und Milch-
strassen," my wits grow more constructive, and I more and more 
look upon the voyage as a very highly educating experience.9 
After nearly three months of sailing, Royce found "the sea a 
perfectly satisfactory cure" for himself. Writing from off 
Melbourne, he was "full of enthusiasm" and longed to go 
hiking on dry land. 10 
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Royce's interaction with nature dated from his child-
hood. He had viewed the vistas of the Sacramento Valley, 
gazed meditatively at the Golden Gate, and hiked alone 
along pine trails on the Coastal Range. During his first six 
years at Harvard, when he added long journeys of laborious 
research and the pressures of publishing to his heavy academ-
ic load, such tastings of nature, while providing welcome re-
lief, were very brief.1 1 Now, however, during the first twelve 
uninterrupted weeks of his voyage, except for his routine 
contacts with the crew, Royce was immersed in nothing but 
nature. Its forces, working down upon him from the outside 
universe and up from within his own organism, wrought 
their cure physically and psychologically. 
Royce's letters written "out of Melbourne" portray a per-
son filled with a new zest for life. He believed in nature's 
tendency to initiate and integrate self-healing processes. 12 
Moreover, as his regular hiking and regimen showed, he 
usually exercised some self-discipline to remain healthy. Not 
only did he write, "I am enjoying myself like a seabird," but 
also, "I am holding myself back from any hard work. "13 As 
the Freeman drew near Melbourne, by day and night Royce 
experienced nature's beauties afresh.14 He began to sense a 
seemingly divine presence alive in all the "suns and milky 
ways" of the universe. All around him, in sea, sky, stars, and 
birds, he felt life passionately and, even more responsively, 
found himself appreciating the ship's captain and crew. 
One vivid interaction occurred shortly after his landing in 
Australia, when Royce went hiking in the Blue Mountains. 
His account of this experience focused primarily on the hu-
man selfs responses rather than on the mountains, valley, 
and waterfall which unleashed his moods and feelings. 15 
On this morning, in company with Alfred Deakin, later 
to become Australia's prime minister, Royce began hiking 
from his hotel high in the Blue Mountains. The two started 
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in a "fairly level and well wooded region with pleasant 
streams visible here and there." Like many other visitors, 
however, Royce soon found the face of nature turning weird 
as the landscape became harsh and gaunt. The Royce who in 
his philosophy strove to include a "genuine romanticism" 
now wove into his account at least as many of his own feelings 
as facts about nature: "Suddenly your path becomes steep, 
rocky, lonesome. You seem to have left all signs of life far be-
hind. The slopes, as you glance downward, look treacherous; 
and you wonder if they do not lead to the edge of some near 
abyss. And then, at a turn in the way, you come indeed to 
the abyss itself. The ground flies away from under your feet. 
A valley stretches out for many miles, and far beneath you. A 
sheer precipice of a thousand or fifteen hundred feet is di-
rectly below where you stand. "16 Here terms like "sudden-
ly," "lonesome," "you glance downward," "treacherous," 
"you wonder if," and "ground flies away from under your 
feet," reflect how Wentworth Valley triggered a gamut of 
feelings in Royce. His "stream of consciousness" manner 
shows him more in touch with his own affections, memories, 
and fancies than with the valley. 
Soon the sight of Wentworth Falls led him to draft an 
even deeper phenomenological description of what occurred 
within himself. Adopting the indefinite "one" and "you," 
he asserted that a majestic natural scene raises people's alert-
ness, lures them fascinatingly, pacifies, and eventually tames 
them. This dialogue between the observer and nature as 
"other" is almost explicit in the following Roycean descrip-
tion of Wentworth Falls and the surrounding cliffs: "All this 
one sees standing himself at the edge of the abyss, the thrill 
of the scene quivering all through his nerves, the fascinating 
depths begging him to step from the rocks and try to imitate 
the water flight himself. . . . Such scenery, I have observed, 
usually first acts to make one very gentle and submissive in 
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mood. One feels like a child watching a great multitude of 
busy folk. It is delightful, but it is also physically overwhelm-
ing. What is going on here is too large to be made out. It 
tames you .... "17 Here Royce described how such scenery 
mysteriously alters our state of consciousness. While we are 
more or less attuned to nature's influences, yet we cannot ra-
tionally contain all the changes of feeling that occur in such 
an experience. Royce later noted how the gradually acquired 
attitudes and frameworks of adult nature-observers can often 
block out the simple brute freshness that a child experiences 
at Wentworth Falls and its surrounding cliffs.1s 
In starting philosophy, one is guided, said Royce, by 
one's temperament. And temperament is partly determined 
by one's feelings and moods towards nature. No need for this 
to degenerate into a sentimental romanticism, or Schwarm-
erei. An authentic employment of affectivity, a genuine ro-
manticism, can be achieved through critical "in-touch-ness" 
with self and nature. 19 
Royce further recorded that in the Blue Mountains he felt 
a certain estrangement. This contrasted with his feelings of 
at-home-ness experienced when hiking in his native Sierra 
Nevada mountains. That he perceived the Blue Mountains as 
melancholy and solemn might have been due in part to this 
feeling of strangeness and aloneness. The valley's gnarled 
trees became for him symbols of evolutionary struggle. Its 
precipices struck fear into him and nature's unexpected turns 
evoked from him a feeling of treachery. Here Royce exempli-
fied that rich mix of spontaneous affective movements whose 
lures, aversions, hopes, and fears provide the matrix of fruit-
ful suggestions and captivating biases out of which rational 
philosophy must critically construct itself. 20 With William 
James and other thinkers, Royce fittingly acknowledged the 
inescapable dependence of philosophers and philosophy on a 
genuinely affective, even romantic, element. 
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We find that his heart skipped not only at beholding 
Wentworth Falls but also at sighting the volcanic regions of 
the North Island of New Zealand.21 Several months later he 
recalled how sublime such scenes were when he again gazed 
at the woods and ridges of his beloved California. A similar 
experience occurred when he sped by Mount Shasta and later 
glimpsed the glory of the Canadian Rockies. Little wonder, 
then, that some of his writings of the 1888 period suggest 
Keats's theme, "Beauty is truth, truth beauty." 
With Thomas B. Howes, captain of the Freeman, Royce 
shared some of his communing with nature.22 While sailing 
through the tropic night, these two would sit on deck, gaze 
into the heavens, and talk over Newcomb's astronomy. With 
such stellar distances confronting them, they grew medita-
tive, wondering whether stars and men were as unreal as 
dreams: Royce's delightful response has been published 
more than once.23 But his humorous tale (which contrasts 
Mark Twain's very funny lectures with Joseph Cook's far less 
funny accounts) and his crude concluding parallel between 
"not so damned funny" and "not so damned real" often en-
tertain readers so much that a key philosophical message is 
missed. For Royce's final remark was, "Even so, Captain, I 
teach at Harvard that the world and the heavens and the stars 
are all real, but not so damned real, you see." 
Here the epistemologist pointed to more than our aware-
ness of two levels of the real when we reflectively judge 
whether nature is real. For by indicating that in such self-pos-
sessed judgments the human self grasps its own knowing as 
more "damned real" than the stars, Royce added that our 
judgments of reality are also judgments of appreciation. This 
germinal idea that we grasp reality and value together flow-
ered into explicit statement twenty-eight years later. In his 
last lecture on metaphysics, Royce taught, "The very recogni-
tion of being is itself an estimate."24 Already in 1888, how-
12 I VoyageandRecuperation 
ever, the contrast effect between himself and the natural 
world as an "other" had led him both to affirm two levels of 
reality and to prize selves more at the level of their unique af. 
fective subjectivity than at the level of their common abstract 
objectivity. This was a step towards his soon-to-be-published 
central distinction between the "World of Appreciation" 
and the "World ofDescription." 25 
Our two close-ups of Royce interacting with nature-with 
Deakin in Wentworth Valley, and with Captain Howes 
under the stars-show that nature touched Royce's affective 
and appreciative, as well as cognitive, potentials. William 
James noticed the same influence, even though he had only 
letters from the South Seas to go by. He exclaimed, "What a 
sight of the world you are getting, and how your cosmic emo-
tions and your empirisches Bewusstsein must increase!" 26 
Royce found nature quite rich, even mysterious, in hermes-
sages to us and saw dialogue with her as fundamental to any 
cosmology. It should not surprise us, then, that a few years 
later (1895), he clearly expressed these themes in his philos-
ophy of nature: "Here about us, as we all admit, whatever 
our ultimate metaphysical views, is the natural world, the 
world that appears to our senses-a world manifesting some 
sort of finite, and obviously, as we mortals see it, some sort of 
highly fragmentary truth .... Our relations with nature are 
thus such as to involve a more or less social contrast between 
our life and the life of nature. And upon this principle every 
philosophy of nature must rest. "27 Here Royce viewed nature 
as alive and partially self-manifestative.28 Basically, as alive 
and evolving, nature calls on our wills to appreciate its life, to 
experience its communication, and to reverence its luring 
mystery. This Roycean principle of interpretation, when ani-
mated by his commitment to engage "reverently . . . face to 
face with a mighty and lovely Nature," furnishes an incipient 
"ethics of ecology. "29 
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Besides his healing contacts with nature, Royce found a 
tonic in the persons he met. He found the ship's company "a 
jolly one, on the whole," and "highly agreeable. "3° His con-
tact with Captain Howes, a person untouched by the ac-
ademic world, helped restore a new philosophical awareness 
in Royce. His interactions with James Martineau-later to be 
evaluated-stimulated his philosophical quest. With his new 
discoveries Royce became positively enthusiastic. He strongly 
felt the will to live so that he could share his new vision with 
WilliamJames and others. He "wanted nothing so much as 
to get back to work," and had to restrain this will to work. 3! 
Once ashore in Australia, he found "very good compan-
ionship," partly thanks to Hodgson's helpful introductions. 
The chief secretary of Victoria was Alfred Deakin, and in ear-
ly June of 1888, Royce and Deakin "found each other." 32 
During hikes and conversations, such as the one in Went-
worth Valley, each of them became in turn the other's pupil 
or teacher as the topic became philosophy or politics or some 
other forte of one of them. Royce found that Deakin em-
bodied the best elements of Australia, and that he offered in-
deed the health-giving support Royce then needed.H Soon 
afterwards he wrote to Deakin, "I had been needing for some 
time a kind of championship that you gave me in an unde-
served degree of fullness. I can't tell you how much you 
brightened me up." 34 Through the succeeding decades, de-
spite the distance between them, these two men continued to 
cultivate by mail the special friendship they began in June 
1888. 
When in Sydney, thanks to Deakin's reports and newspa-
per accounts, Royce kept in touch with the Conference of the 
Society for the Federation (of the Australian states). He 
found its delegates highly interesting. Their factional choices 
of attitudes and policies intrigued him, as did the foreseeable 
effects of these choices upon themselves and "Australia." 
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For, at that time, their six self-governing colonies were quite 
independent of one another and would require thirteen more 
years to form a federation. 
Then leaving Sydney in the company of another Austra-
lian political figure, Sir Saul Samuel, he headed for Auck-
land on the Zealandia and learned from Sir Saul a political 
viewpoint noticeably divergent from Deakin' s.3 5 He found 
New Zealand's climate and scenery an even more healthy 
balm than Australia's. In the land of the Maoris, he learned 
their ancestral story-how their tribe came from Hawaiki 
across risky ocean stretches to New Zealand, some even com-
ing "in the canoe Tai-Nui. "36 These Maoris fascinated Royce 
for decades, not least of all because of their communal felt 
need to pass on from generation to generation the "ideal past 
event" of their original adventuresome coming to New Zea-
land.37 
On the steamer Alameda, headed for San Francisco, 
Royce met a man from the backwoods of Australia. So much 
had this pioneer's rugged life schooled him into a masterful 
blend of self-reliance and complete dedication to his neigh-
bors "in the bush" that Royce found in him-as we shall 
soon discover in more detail-the concretized idea of the 
"loyal man." Loyalty was again stressed in Royce's travels 
when he reached his family in California and found them 
distraught by the recent loss of his father. From his family he 
learned to appreciate even more the loyal responsibility of 
caring for his health lest he abandon those who depended on 
him. 
During the latter half of his journey, then, Royce was 
reaching out, in respectful dialogue, to persons as different as 
Captain Howes, Deakin, Sir Saul, and the backwoodsman 
from Australia. He wholeheartedly and easily enjoyed most 
of them. Under their influence he took decisive initiatives 
impossible several months earlier when he was an apathetic 
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patient. Now a lively will welled up through his personality. 
For instance, after reappraising his chances for a sounder cure 
in New Zealand, and after seeking counsel from Sir Saul, 
Royce had unexpectedly decided to remain there rather than 
to proceed as planned to the Sandwich Islands.38 Moreover, 
looking back to the nadir just passed, Royce had reported, "I 
have found my will all sound. "39 And, as if in confirmation 
of this, he resolved to take greater care of his health in the 
future. Even more significant was his resolve, "But I won't 
let myself be discouraged." In these ways, then, the volition-
al side of Royce's temperament was reenlivened both by per-




Acquaintance with Royce's temperament readies us to in-
vestigate his intellectual progress on his 1888 trip. Presum-
ably the lengthy, journallike manuscript which Royce mailed 
from Australia to his wife would reveal something of his in-
tellectual speculations aboard, for he acknowledged that only 
to her "have I tried to be anywhere nearly complete." 1 Yet 
even if extant, this document is not available in any archive 
known to Roycean scholars. Hence the crucial question be-
comes, How extensive, clear, and reliable are the main clues 
that are available to us?2 Arranged chronologically, these are: 
Royce's first sketch with note (April 5 and 6), his marginalia 
on Martineau (about May 6), and the long letter Royce 
drafted to William James on May 21 while off Melbourne. 
An initial survey of these three pieces of evidence seems in 
order. 
Royce's philosophical journal of 1888 begins with the 
heading "Barque Freeman, April5, '88."3 Without so much 
as a word to hint at his recent weeks of depression, Royce here 
articulated his new insight into an outline of a book to be 
called "The World as Paradox and as Ideal. "4 For him it was 
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"the first sketch of a discussion of critical and constructive 
philosophy as now projected in the form of an essay." By 
April 5, then, Royce was clearly well enough to attempt some 
profound philosophizing. Otherwise, he could not have 
elaborated this plan for a systematic metaphysical work 
whose three books integrated seventeen chapters. Since he 
often recast this sketch once he had returned to Cambridge, 
he evidently viewed it as a tentative effort to express his new 
metaphysical speculation. 5 
Royce intended to begin his work by setting forth and il-
lustrating "the fundamental issue between the necessity and 
freedom aspects of reality." This first sketch clearly reveals 
Royce already striving to straighten out the paradoxes arising 
from continuity, freedom, and the world-formula. He 
sought to clarify his insight by employing the analogy of dif-
ferential coefficients and the mathematical logic they imply. 
In this draft he did not yet apply his speculation to loyalty or 
sociopolitical theory. He described his Universal Thought as 
an "Absolute Will [which] must know itself as an infinity of 
arrested volitions . ... Each [of the latter] must be a concrete 
expression of the one universal tendency or inner law. "6 He 
echoed the concerns and spirit of Schopenhauer and Kant 
throughout this outline, and although he alluded to Wundt, 
Spencer, Spinoza, and the Stoics, nowhere did he yet 
mention James Martineau. However, Royce's handwriting 
slackened and showed fatigue as it neared the end of these 
sixteen pages of metaphysics. Meanwhile, his style of devel-
oping the chapter outlines into full paragraphs tapered off 
into simply jotting down bare or almost bare chapter head-
mgs. 
Chronologically, our second main set of clues comes from 
the marginalia which Royce, during his Australian voyage, 
inscribed on his copies of]ames Martineau's A Study ofReli-
gionJ Finally, we possess Royce's letter of May 21, 1888, to 
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William James. Because of the limitations of letter writing, 
Royce despaired of describing adequately this "new spec-
imen" even to his philosopher friend; yet we will find in this 
letter our critical source of evidence because of its disciplined 
faithfulness to Royce's recent intellectual experience. 
To evaluate these three main sets of clues, we must use 
skill to avoid the extreme either of pressing them too hard or 
of failing to get fully in touch with them. Royce's original 
manuscript of "The World as Paradox and as Ideal" seems 
valid only as a subsidiary witness. When drafting this out-
line, he had not yet fully recovered his health. He later re-
peatedly recast it. Hence, we will not rely on this first sketch 
in the following critical analysis, except insofar as this earliest 
witness confirms our main findings through its tentative first 
signals of his new speculation. 
Royce's marginalia on Martineau constitute a different 
kind of witness. They are critical philosophical responses 
rather than an attempt at system-building. Moreover, the 
final three-quarters of Martineau's A Study of Religion re-
ceived Royce's penciled observations about a month after 
Royce first outlined his projected book-that is, when he cer-
tainly had grown in strength of body and vigor of mind. 
Therefore, while insisting on their subordinate rank, we will 
search these marginalia to discover what light, if any, they 
cast upon Royce's remarks to James about a new and enliven-
ing metaphysical speculation. 
First and foremost, however, we will rank Royce's May 21 
letter to James. It is granted that the description of Royce's 
new insight is jejune and general. Nevertheless, this letter 
deserves to become our controlling text because it is disci-
plined internally by one philosopher's endeavor to com-
municate his revised metaphysics to a friendly but critical 
colleague. 
Before we attempt to analyze Royce's May 21 letter to 
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James, let us read carefully in its wholeness the "confession" 
it contains. Royce sets the scene in his first two sentences; 
then beginning with "In fine," he describes his mind sub-
stantially. 
With the winds and the birds of the southern sea came a new life . 
. . . And now that passion has come again, and the good Lord 
seems to have some life in his world of "Sonnen und Milchstras-
sen," my wits grow more constructive, and I more and more look 
upon the voyage as a very highly educating experience. In fine, I 
have largely straightened out the big metaphysical tangle about 
continuity, freedom, and the world-formula, which, as you remem-
ber, I had aboard with me when I started, and I am ready to amuse 
you with a metaphysical speculation of a very simple, but, as now 
seems to me, of a very expansive nature, which does more to make 
the dry bones of my "Universal Thought" live than any prophesy-
ing I have heretofore had the fortune to do. The fields of specula-
tion are very wide and romantic, after all, and great is the fun of 
bringing down new game. I must live to tell about this new spec-
imen, at any rate. But I despair of describing it to you in this letter. 
I must wait until we meet. Suffice it that the old trouble about 
Continuity has come to seem to me very enlightening for the whole 
range of metaphysics, but particularly for our question about Free-
dom and the Ideals. I can't imagine why people will thrash the old 
straw in discussing this question. Dear good Martineau runs the 
same old treadmill for half his book. The thing has endlessly nu-
merous novelties in it, just because it is a burning problem of life. 
Why not be somewhat vital and personal in thinking out what is 
after all an immediate vital issue of every moment?-But alas! per-
haps my suggestions will seem to you as arid and old as any others. 
But wait till we meet, and we shall see. 8 
Here Royce confessed finding a "metaphysical speculation" 
that gave new life to his earlier philosophy. According to the 
nexus suggested by his "In fine," the roots of his new spec-
ulation lay in his affective awakening, his freshened sense of 
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a life-giving divine milieu in the universe, and his present 
"more constructive" trend of mind. The scope of his new 
speculation reached to cosmology, morals, and metaphys-
ics-for he had largely unraveled the "tangle about continu-
ity, freedom, and the world-formula." This interpretation of 
scope is confirmed by his use of "metaphysics'; three para-
graphs later in a portion of the letter not quoted above. 
There "metaphysics" means not only the relation of stars and 
the physical world to the world of the knowing, valuing, fi-
nite selves but also the relation of all these to the Cognitively 
Inclusive, Appreciating, Infinite Self. 
For about five years Royce had viewed this basic, familiar, 
complex relation mainly along logical and epistemological 
avenues.9 But now he wanted to be "vital" and "personal" in 
"thinking out ... an immediate vital issue of every mo-
ment," in which this relation was immediately felt as "a 
burning problem of life." Fortunately, his "Sonnen und 
Milchstrassen" allusion to the conclusion of book 4 of Scho-
penhauer' s The World as Will and Presentation unintention-
ally establishes a benchmark which locates and dates one 
significant outcropping of this life interest that was gradually 
becoming more dominant in Royce's thought. For he later 
revealed that after The Religious Aspect, rather than focusing 
mainly on the World as Presentation (as Object or Thought), 
he had found the World as Will and Experience (as Purpose 
and Appreciation ofValue) growing more central in his inter-
ests.l0 Fittingly enough, a recently recuperated Royce per-
ceived his basic metaphysical relation to be permeated now 
with life-giving and healing energies. 
By balancing its contrasting marks, he described his "new 
speculation." It was "very simple" yet "very expansive." It 
was "an immediate vital issue of every moment," yet in-
volved "very wide and romantic" fields of speculation. If 
Royce were not a "complex mind," such utterances might at 
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first puzzle us. Yet he provided the nexus between the appar-
ent contraries. "The thing has endlessly numerous novelties 
in it, just because it is a burning problem of life" (emphasis 
added). His insight into every moment's "vital issue" 
ceaselessly opened up new directions for exploring meta-
physics, morals, and cosmology. Royce found great fun in 
"bringing down new game" like this, particularly since his 
struggle to understand continuity now led to new insights 
into freedom and the ideals. In sum, his burning life-
problem seems to have been, How could the inmost self, not 
bound by continuity, yet confronted by the call of each 
moment's "whither now?" generate ideals and how could 
this self freely strive to embody these ideals by true willing 
rather than by blind willing? 
His "Suffice it" revealed more specific clues. For Royce, 
the dark "old trouble about Continuity" has been trans-
formed into a great light for all metaphysics.11 This was espe-
cially true for his and James's "question about Freedom and 
the Ideals." Here Roycean readers discern a characteristic 
theme. Just as Royce had penetrated doubt to find certitude, 
and the possibility of error to find an Unerring Knower, so 
now had he not penetrated his old trouble about continuity 
to find at the heart of the trouble a noncontinuous, enlight-
ening, free self? In brief, is he not moving here through his 
World of Description only to find that it requires a World of 
Appreciation from which it derives? 12 
To further illuminate the hints in this letter about his 
new "metaphysical speculation," we now turn to Royce's 
1888 marginalia on Martineau. They reveal Royce's "com-
plex mind," that is, they show how intricate was the "tangle 
about continuity, freedom, and the world-formula" with 
which he struggled. 
As Royce sailed into the southern seas, he began to read 
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Martineau's two-volume A Study of Religion. He made only 
a few jottings in the first volume until Martineau had com-
pleted his evaluation of Royce's own Religious Aspect ofPhi-
losophy.B After that, the marginalia became more frequent 
and continued through the second volume. 
Royce seems to have venerated Martineau much as he did 
his Harvard colleague, George Herbert Palmer-although he 
found both too pious to be rigorously logical. Martineau 
seemed "so warmhearted and sympathetic," even though too 
simple and unrealistic about the problem of evil. 14 In A 
Study of Religion, Royce was impressed by Martineau's re-
fusal to go along with Comte or Spencer when they defined 
religion without God. Martineau had written: " . . . by Reli-
gion I understand the belief and worship of Supreme Mind 
and Will, directing the Universe and holding moral relations 
with human life. "ts After reading lines such as these, Royce 
interestingly altered what he then came to view as "the dry 
bones of my 'Universal Thought' " into an enlivening con-
crete Personal Self in communion with all finite selves. But it 
was a Self whose living Logos still retained priority over its 
free agency and power. 16 
Despite this insight, "dear good Martineau" irritated 
Royce on several counts. We find the penciled note: "But M. 
[Martineau] cares not whether he be mystical and romantic, 
or intellectual and prosaic. It is all one [to him]."17 Such con-
fusion of the mystical and logical modes of thought raised 
Royce's caution. Secondly, Royce felt that Martineau "de-
clines to face fully and fairly . . . the difficulty that, in a 
moral world, a free agent should be permitted to cause an-
other not merely to suffer, but to sin, to be morally de-
graded." Repeatedly Royce indicated that Martineau left "no 
room for the devil" and in general declined to face the prob-
lem of evil. 18 
Concerning his own Religious Aspect of Philosophy, 
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what critique did Royce receive from Martineau?19 It was an 
"original and vigorous" work, said Martineau, who also ac-
knowledged Royce's "brilliant ingenuity." But Martineau 
had serious reservations about Royce's Infinite Knower, who 
was "all-seeing, all-judging, right-thinking, but doing noth-
ing and preventing nothing; it is the infinitude of Reason 
and the negation of will. "20 This critique found its mark, for 
Royce not only now began in earnest to jot dozens of notes in 
the margins of his copy of Martineau, but soon described the 
center of his previous philosophy as "dry bones." Some of 
Royce's marginalia ran to a page or more. From all of them, I 
select about a half dozen sets that seem most to illuminate 
his May 21, 1888, letter to James. But before entering into 
any discussion of these marginalia, we should perhaps note 
the method employed to interpret them. 
Our order of considering these marginalia will generally 
be Royce's own order of writing them, supposing he read 
Martineau continuously. From the series of marginalia, the 
overall movement of Royce's thought emerges as follows. 
Royce moves from continuity through finite willing to Infi-
nite Alter Ego, whose all-knowing is both the life-function 
that is more primordial than free agency or power (contrary 
to Martineau's view) and also the "true solution" of the 
problem of permitting moral evil.2 1 Accordingly, the under-
lying metaphysical questions with which Royce seems serially 
to have grappled are: 1) Shall my primary route to metaphys-
ics lie through the humanly experienced object or through 
the experiencing subject? 2) If the latter, shall my order in 
metaphysics move from agency and power to knowing as de-
rivative (as in Martineau's order)? Or, rather, should my 
order move through power and agency down to infinite-
knowing first as originative of true willing, then as permis-
sively inclusive of false willing, and finally as constitutive of 
Being? Royce opted for the latter order. Accordingly, we turn 
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to inspect some of Royce's marginalia and then to add brief 
. comments which we hope will shed additional light on his 
letter to James. 
When Martineau wrote about the "underlying continuum 
of Time," Royce jotted: "Both K[ant] and M. are not suf-
ficiently aware that time is at the start no continuum at all." 
Soon when Martineau asserted, "Kant allows that self-
knowledge at least is possible," Royce noted down the qual-
ification: "But only knowledge of present self." 22 
Royce here reasserted the limited starting point he had al-
ready employed for a decade-namely, the present self in its 
self-knowledge. In this self is the start of time, a start that is 
deeper than continuity and therefore somehow prior to it, 
more real than it, and thus more valuable than it. By think-
ing philosophically, Royce had now made himself reflectively 
present to "the vital issue of every moment" -the issue of 
which he was concomitantly conscious during his nonreflec-
tive moments. This issue was how the now-actual self, pres-
ent to its preconscious and conscious life-flow (with all its 
biological, psychological, and spiritual activities and passiv-
ities), is called to handle and actually does handle this life-
flow. At this depth, the self s finite freedom is the origin of 
time, and hence of continuity.B Already Royce's dark "trou-
ble with Continuity" (with its world of description and cau-
sation) is paradoxically "enlightening . . . the whole range 
of metaphysics" (with its world of freely appreciative selves). 
As mentioned, after making these notes, Royce soon encoun-
tered Martineau's exposition and critique of The Religious 
Aspect a/Philosophy. 
When Martineau thereafter treated theism according to 
"Explicit and Implicit Will," Royce wrote in the margin: 
"The determinating [sic] character of a cause as choosing this 
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from that requires the cause to be true volition as distinct 
from blind power. "24 By requiring that a "choosing cause" 
have a true volition to determine its choice soundly, under 
pain of otherwise becoming a blind power, Royce put the 
present choosing self into the genuine appreciative world and 
not into the morally evil world of untrue volitions. But his re-
quirement of truth to guide the present self s volition implic-
idy raised the question whether it can get truth of itself or 
needs some other or others to attain truth. 
A dozen pages later, when Martineau criticized Theodore 
Parker's abstract Infinite, Royce noted: "M's answer to Par-
ker is that the Infinite, far from being the abstract total, is for 
us the Alter Ego of the finite. "25 Like Martineau's recent cri-
tique of Royce's "Universal Thought" as a do-nothing and a 
"negation of will," this critique of Parker's "abstract total 
Infinite" moved Royce to concretize and enliven his Logos by 
getting into intersubjective relation with it, as "Alter Ego." 26 
Whatever the factual connections of Martineau's texts 
with Royce's insights, by thinking of the Infinite as the Alter 
Ego of the finite, Royce here placed himself in a concrete in-
tersubjective universe. The Infinite Alter Ego is viewed as a 
superhuman personal Subject, different from each finite self, 
yet being the ultimate center of identification for each self 
since the latter regards the Infinite Alter Ego as its own Other 
Self. Interestingly, this relationship to the Infinite Alter Ego 
runs through the whole human community as a real, nonin-
dividual, shared life that mediates between every member 
and the Infinite Alter Ego. After criticizing Martineau for not 
appreciating social consciousness, Royce raised a character-
istic question: "Is it not then the social rather than the indi-
vidual conscience which is objective and the road towards the 
divine?"27 The finite, individual, moral conscience needs to 
undergo the demands of the human community in order to 
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achieve objectivity and a resultant orientation to the divine 
Alter Ego. Royce viewed such a "Theocratic conception of 
Society" sounder than Martineau's. For the free judgment of 
each finite self is impossible without a call-to-the-other-
both to the human others in community and to the Infinite 
Other. This radical call, or appeal, became a key intersubjec-
tive aspect of Royce's later philosophy. 28 
But was this discovery of intersubjectivity, of a free call 
(and response) operative in each judgment, the deepest 
thought to which Royce came during his 1888 cruise? Having 
a sense for reality's complexity, Royce saw that the more ex-
periential norm of human and divine intersubjectivity itself 
needed to be constantly steadied by an anchoring norm 
intrinsic to Being. After a few pages, he jotted his most meta-
physical note. Our strategic estimate of its importance is con-
firmed by the sleuthing of a master researcher, Ralph Barton 
Perry. He, too, evidently tracked Royce back to his margin-
alia on Martineau's A Study ofReligion.29 On encountering 
the present metaphysical gem, Perry made it, as far as I can 
determine, the only specimen he lifted out by hand-copy 
from Royce's marginalia. Perry's selection suggests that he 
discovered here the bright carat-value he cherished. Un-
doubtedly it is the clearest statement we have of Royce's 
metaphysical position on his 1888 cruise. It gives additional 
depth and sparkle to his 1885 starting point and theistic ar-
gument. Such a key text calls for special study. 
Royce avowed to James that the "trouble about Continu-
ity" seemed particularly enlightening "for our question 
about Freedom and the Ideals." In the text that follows, al-
though only "Freedom" is mentioned explicitly, "Continu-
ity" and the "Ideals" operate so near the surface that the text 
seems to give a clear picture of how Royce then viewed all 
three. I regard it as the closest we can come to the basis of 
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Royce's "metaphysical speculation" of 1888. Along Mar-
tineau's margin, Royce's hand etched all the following em-
phases, dashes, parentheses, and brackets-in an abundance 
unusual even for Royce-as he wrote: 
If nothing be clearer than that the true Knower must include his 
known object [and this principle I conceive to be absolutely true], 
then God as all-Knower, must include us. How our agency is saved 
in such a world, is another and a later question. But Freedom and 
Agency must simply take care of themselves until the conditions of 
Knowing (which are the conditions constitutive of Being) are saved 
and satisfied to the full. -For M. the consciousness of agency is the 
beginning of wisdom, and its demands must be first met. For me it 
is knowledge as such that is the first datum of all Thinking- -A 
finite knowledge as such being self-contradictory, therefore (as I 
conceive) must the true subject be the Infinite All-Knower, and 
thus the all-includer. Agency and causation find their due place in 
and for this Knower. 3° 
In this text I find: 1) a par excellence sense of truth, 
knowledge, and being; 2) a settling of basic metaphysical 
options for Royce; 3) a clear instance of how Royce phi-
losophized through conceptions and inferences; and 4) a 
concrete theistic termination of his inference to an Infinite 
All-Knowing Self. Some exposition of these four aspects of 
the Roycean text seems in order. 
In the phrases "true Knower" and "true subject," Royce 
significantly uses "true" to point to a par excellence mean-
ing, that is, to a teleological sense of the ultimately genuine 
and real. For him, finite knowing is always less than fully 
true, and is always done by a self or subject not standing fully 
in himself. Accordingly, the text reveals which ideals operate 
here and how they operate. The "genuinely true" is envi-
sioned as a key ideal, and implicitly opposed to the erroneous 
and even to whatever is not yet fully true. All-inclusive unity 
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is another ideal functioning in contrast to the fragmentation 
which leaves some elements totally unrelated. "Being" func-
tions in contrast to the unreal. 
Moreover, "freedom" and "agency" are clearly given are-
duced priority. So, the fullest Knowing, Being, and Unity 
are Royce's chosen triad of basic ideals. They are seen to oper-
ate in a par excellence way, so that all finite knowing, being, 
and unity can get their value only through teleological iden-
tification with the Infinite Knower. As Subject, he is the goal 
for these objects of his knowing. As Infinite Self, he is the 
inescapable norm for all ministerial selves in their finite free-
dom and agency-a matter that another marginal note clar-
ifiesY 
According to this central Roycean text, man in his quest 
for wisdom is confronted with the radical option of starting 
either from the consciousness of agency, as Martineau did, or 
from knowledge as such, as Royce judged the wiser course. 
Knowledge as such leads him to make the crucial distinction 
between the Infinite Knower and finite knowers. To try to 
think of a finite knower simply as such is to attempt the in-
conceivable, for finite knowers and doers unavoidably "are at 
once the objects and ministers of [Infinite] Thought. "3 2 Of 
all knowers the latter alone has no "object just beyond" and 
no "subject just below." Into the basis of his metaphysical 
speculation, Royce built several radical choices. Not only did 
he prefer knowledge as such to agency, in contrast to Mar-
tineau. He also preferred to make the conditions of knowing 
be the conditions constitutive of Being. So at least for us, as 
human knowers and beings, knowledge has a constitutive 
priority over Being, and subjectivity has a priority over objec-
tivity, even though in both pairs either pole implies the 
other. 
This key marginal comment further displays how Royce 
did his philosophy through true conceptions and the infer-
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ences they generate. More obviously, it shows him opting for 
a particular starting point from which he will infer an order 
of questions. The basic initial conception he explores here is 
that of true Knower. And as seen, he ultimately finds finite 
knowledge as such inconceivable. 
Royce's early "then ... must," and his emphasized 
"therefore . . . must" near the close of this notation, reflect 
his commitment to develop wisdom by reasoning out impli-
cations from some maximally clear starting point. Since 
"knowledge as such is the first datum of all Thinking," it 
won Royce's acceptance as his starting point. From this he 
needed to find and maintain an order of metaphysical ques-
tions without violating his system of all-inclusive unity. 
Through the inclusiveness of the true Knower everything is 
internally related to everything else. Because Royce united 
this internal relationship with his posited priority of Know-
ing-Being, he had to relegate freedom and agency to a sec-
ondary rank. 
Royce's inference moved necessarily beyond finitude to 
its theistic term, the Infinite All-Knower, who is here identi-
fied with God insofar as he is related to us by his knowledge. 
When Royce touched here the all-inclusive Divine Knower, 
he reached ultimate concreteness in his metaphysics. For the 
Infinite All-Knower must include himself as object and thus 
constitute himself a Divine Self. 
It would take Royce decades to work out the unique in-
dividuations of the Divine Self and of ourselves in their 
reciprocity. Yet, this text reveals in seminal form the rela-
tionship between the Infinite Self and finite selves. In time it 
would germinate as the living root of his Conception of God 
(1897) and The World and the Individual (1899-1901). Yet 
already in 1888, the way Royce perceived his new "meta-
physical speculation" -a way he readily shared with James-
was that it had more power than any previous conception of 
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his to make live the "dry bones" of his Universal Thought. 
It is notewonhy that Royce experienced his speculative 
contact with this Infinite Alter Ego, or Knower inclusive of 
us, or Divine Self, as most enlivening and so shared it with 
James. He thus revealed his valuation of life and its Source. 
That giving of life which is based on knowing now func-
tioned as a key value in Royce's speculation and as a root of 
his World of Appreciation. True, he did not here use the 
term "divine living Self." But its Reality operated as the con-
trol of the metaphysical order which Royce clearly set down 
here: first and deepest, the Infinite True Knower of all; 
secondly, the world of finite, not-fully-true knowers; and 
thirdly, the world of physical causation among objects which 
we view as nonknowing. Upon this basic order he built his 
1892 distinction between the Worlds of Appreciation and 
Description. 
In the central marginal note just discussed, Royce put 
knowledge before freedom and valued the lived relationships 
between concrete selves (finite and infinite) more than the 
"dry bones" of abstract universals. Now, as he entered Mar-
tineau's chapter on determinism and free will, what pressed 
in on him, to judge from his notes, was the problem of unit-
ing knowledge with freedom-that is, of synthesizing spec-
ulative truth with practical self-commitment in community. 
Speculatively, the thought of a finite thinker included the 
Infinite Knower. But Royce's practical experience of himself 
in moral agency made him confess his sense of being compan-
ioned, his uncertainty about the identity of the agent or 
agents responsible, and his humble sense of hope in some di-
vine presence and leadership at work in his moral efforts. In 
such notes he moved along Martineau's main line that God is 
"ruling the universe and holding moral relations with man-
kind,"33 but at the same time Royce repudiated Martineau's 
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assumption that as individuals we are wholly autonomous 
agents. 
For example, Martineau proposed that his own awareness 
of commanding his lower self (with its emotions and inclina-
tions) was evidence enough for recognizing himself as one 
and the same as the agent who exercised freedom in this com-
mand. Summing up his view, Martineau wrote, "I submit 
that the consciousness of self, as an identical personality, is 
the consciousness of such power [of freely commanding one's 
feelings]. "34 To this, Royce countered: 
But consciousness is not a sufficient witness in me to such a power. 
God knows, not I, if I be such. 
Those who base my freedom on the mere fact of my moral con-
sciousness, forget that this consciousness is essentially critical. It can 
say what one ought to do tf he is a moral agent. This it says alike of 
Paul, or of Hamlet, or of myself. But that Paul is a moral agent I 
know not, for perhaps Christ works in him. That Hamlet is not such 
an agent I know, because he does not exist save as a poetic creation. 
Even so however, I myself, as moral critic, know not whether I can 
do so and so, but only that whoever works in me is responsible. . . . 
That somebody is at work here in me is not only my irresistible 
impression, but is a philosophically justifiable notion. But who it is 
I cannot tell. My heart is too little mine to know. I can only hope. 35 
As mentioned, Royce's mind has fittingly been described as 
"trying to control a bursting complexity of thought."36 The 
confession in this marginal notation reveals an authentic di-
mension of his mind much less well known than his commit-
ment to a priority for knowledge which the immediately pre-
ceding marginal comment manifested. Hence, this latest 
marginal note needs a close study. 
First, Royce wrote that when he critically examined his 
consciousness of commanding his own feelings, he did not 
find enough evidence to declare that the power of freedom 
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was solely his own. Within his experience of controlling his 
feelings, his agnosticism did not have as its target whether 
some moral agent was operating. Of that he was sure. But he 
focused on his own inability, as a finite knower, to identify 
certainly which of the several selves within Royce was or were 
responsible for this control of his feelings. First, there was the 
divine Alter Ego of which he wrote. Secondly, a few pages 
later Royce would write of a "sinner self': "I find myself a 
sinner in my first moment of moral consciousness. "37 In the 
present marginal notation, his lines echoed chapters 7 and 8 
of Paul's letter to the Romans with its plurality of selves. 
Other "inner selves," at which Royce had earlier hinted, 
and to which he soon would draw public attention in his 
1894 "Meister Eckhart" article, almost certainly complicated 
Royce's problem of identification here. 38 For included 
among Royce's "many selves" were his bodily self, with its 
"powers" of reasoning, planning, and deciding; his ideal 
· self, which he hoped to bring to realization; and his Funkelin 
self-that uncreated spark in Royce which was God's living 
idea of Royce. Little wonder, then, that he could not discern 
within such mysterious depths exactly which self was active in 
his moral deed. 
At the start of the last paragraph in this marginal nota-
tion, Royce acknowledged undergoing an "irresistible im-
pression" that somebody was at work in him, without being 
able to tell certainly who it was. If he were in an ordinary 
psychic state when he wrote this, he was an unusually acute 
discerner of his own ordinary states. But his "irresistible im-
pression" that an unidentified somebody was at work sug-
gests rather that he was then undergoing a "peak experi-
ence" -something his letter to James corroborates. When a 
person is in a "peak experience," a creative energy inside him 
apparently possesses and directs him rather than he directing 
it. This leads him easily to wonder whether he is not really 
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the more passive, yet cooperative, instrument of some higher 
creative self at work within himself. Royce here found that 
his moral agency had this mysterious unidentifiability at its 
roots. Accordingly, lover of clarity that he was, he placed 
moral agency in a metaphysical position secondary to knowl-
edge as such, his first datum of thinking, by which he could 
identify this creative agency. 
In the same paragraph, after describing his "irresistible 
impression," Royce went on to assert that philosophy can 
validate the notion of such an unidentified agency. Here his 
mind hovered because its one certainty was surrounded by 
correlative ignorances. For he knew someone was acting-a 
knowledge he found validated by his present "irresistible im-
pression." Yet, as he confronted the mysteries of his own (or 
other's) individuality and of the identifiability of individual 
selves, he also experientially knew his ignorances. 
How characteristic of Royce was his next line, "My heart is 
too little mine to know. I can only hope." Though he was at 
his own center (indicated by his use of "my heart" in the 
usual biblical sense), still he confessed feeling the limits of 
his own self-knowledge. Yet instead of allowing this uncer-
tainty and mystery to draw him into a despair of knowing, he 
interpreted whatever was going on in his heart as being some-
how worthwhile and calling for hope. Here Royce overcame 
his lack of knowledge through his Pauline hope that some-
how he was a genuine moral agent and, further, that indeed 
a higher moral agent was working in and through him. 
Besides this blend of knowledge with ignorance and of 
uncertainty with hope, the passage shows Royce's critical acu-
men. He asserted here the need for a more critical posture 
than Martineau displayed when the latter inferentially iden-
tified his own selfuood from the experience of his power to 
command. Royce refrained from inferentially declaring the 
moral agent to be one wholly autonomous self. He neither 
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affirmed nor denied that some other was working in him and 
with him. Thus, almost a decade before his 1896 insight into 
individuality, Royce already manifested how hard the ques-
tion of the identifiability of a unique individual pressed 
him.39 
Finally, Royce critically adopted here the attitude neither 
of an ontologist nor of a naturalist. For whatever the self was, 
it was not some wholly unrelated D£ng-an-s£ch that ontol-
ogists claim to know, nor any of those self-sufficient sub-
stances they construct. On the other hand, he did not start 
off by ruling out all nonnatural "preexistent reals" -a hasty 
methodological exclusion which naturalists demand in ad-
vance.40 Avoiding both kinds of pretensions, Royce kept his 
mind open to a possible cooperation with moral agents in an 
unseen world. But he regarded these as objects, not of knowl-
edge, but of hope. 
In the marginal note just studied, Royce was implicitly 
testing his "metaphysical speculation." Would it stand up 
against the problem of evil already experienced in his own ig-
norance about moral agency? In other words, could the All-
Knower, as the basis of Royce's "metaphysical speculation," 
include all moral agents, despite all their finite ignorance? 
Now Royce let the full force of the problem of evil supply the 
supreme testing of his "metaphysical speculation": Could 
the All-Knower maintain unity in the moral order even while 
permitting the deepest moral evil? For, as Royce had noted in 
his key text, "Agency and causation find their due place in 
and for this Knower." Thus, he now asked whether a moral 
universe can be preserved if finite selves are agents of moral 
evil and even "cause another to sin." 
Even though the Infinite Seer's speculative knowledge 
did not suffice to build the sort of unity needed in a moral 
universe, would his practical Self-Knowledge provide the 
basic unity needed to allow and yet contain such a permissive 
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sweep to moral evil? For such Self-Knowledge freely com-
mitted itself to its chosen ideals and then embodied them in 
each finite self's "immediate vital issue of every moment." 
In two marginalia on the problem of evil, Royce developed 
his argument. He moved no longer simply through the possi-
bility of (speculative) error, but now through the moral per-
missibility of an inborn finite hostility toward the Infinite 
Appreciator. 
While reading Martineau's chapter on moral evil, Royce 
wrote in the margin: 
Here is the difficulty which M. declines to face fully and fairly, in 
this discussion; viz., the difficulty that, in a moral world, one free 
agent should be permitted to cause another not merely to suffer, 
but to sin, to be morally degraded. For it is in and through the re-
sulting moral degradation and crime of the victims that persecution 
and slave-making show their truly evil character. The physical suf-
fering that they cause is not their greatest fault. This difficulty not 
only has a solution, but embodies the true solution of the whole 
business. Mr. M. slights it. 41 
Royce discerned that "the true solution of the whole busi-
ness" lay within this difficulty which Martineau had failed to 
face. Royce's response here ran parallel to his characteristic 
way of penetrating the possibility of error in order to recog-
nize the Unerring Knower. "The bone in his throat" with 
which he now struggled was "that, in a moral world, one free 
agent should be permitted to cause another . . . to sin." 
How could this be for the better? For, if permitted evil were 
not for the better, then our moral world, where such factual 
permission operates, is for the worse. Ultimately, there 
would be total moral disorder and life would be radically ab-
surd. 
Royce countered such irrationalism with a "true solu-
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tion," namely, that indispensable condition which warrants 
permitting a finite self to mislead another morally. For if 
somebody is _at work within a finite self s moral agency, the 
somebody must include a practically committed Infinite Ap-
preciator of certain ideals. This All-Knower freely wants to 
express these ideals both by himself and by a community of 
finite instrumental selves working according to their limita-
tions in knowledge and freedom. Without the directive pres-
ence of such an Appreciator of ideals (who is also Operative 
Director of their realization in the moral universe and Effec-
tive Restorer of finite fragmentations in that universe) both 
the misleading and the misled finite selves would ultimately 
be living in a universe invalidly normed-that is, in a chaot-
ic, absurd universe. But the factual permission of such moral 
evil-for example, when parents transmit inborn vicious in-
clinations to their children-entails the factual establishment 
of its correlative moral good as norm. But this, in turn, re-
quires an Infinite Appreciator who keeps all finite moral 
agents in a highly pluralistic but ultimately unified moral 
umverse. 
Later on, when Martineau treated the psychology of vol-
untary action, Royce wrote a long marginal comment on a 
kind of original sin which fate causes to be transmitted to us. 
Royce's previous concern-how does such causation find its 
due place in and for such a Knower-seems the context with-
in which he jotted: 
This doctrine, (that my sinfulness of character, even if I did not 
make it, but another, still in part condemns me), must be admitted 
by even the partisans of free-will. For there is a doubleness about 
the consciousness of sin that Paul first stated. !find myself a sinner 
in the first moment of my moral consciousness. This is the truth of 
original sin. But then I find, when I go wrong afterwards, that I 
now sin in the light and afresh. The first or original sin, my selfish 
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love of freedom, is inborn, and so not free. It is my proper but pre-
destined viciousness of heart. With this burden aboard I must 
fight. My second sin, my yielding, may be free or not. If it is free, 
then indeed I am a moral agent, with a second and graver load of 
blame on me. But unless I could first sin by fate, the moral world 
would have no gravity. For then one agent could not "cause an-
other to sin," say as by begetting a vicious son. 42 
One of Royce's most profound and perilous insights lies in 
this text. When he confessed, "Ifi'nd myself a sinner in the 
first moment of my moral consciousness," he manifested 
more than an experience of inner deviancy countered by the 
moral "ought." For as sinner (and not mere nonconformist), 
Royce found himself "in part condemned" (judged not 
completely right) by God, the Infinite Alter Ego and Ap-
preciator. His felt alienation from the All-Holy exposed 
a profound dimension in Royce's moral consciousness-a di-
mension disregarded by most current ethicians of perfect 
autonomy. Yet his deep insight also verges on the dangerous, 
although his "in part" may save this idea. For here Royce did 
not connect his insight with the love, mercy, and healing of 
the Divine Appreciator, as decades later he would explicitly 
do in his Problem of Christianity. 43 
In the two final sentences of this last marginal notation, 
Royce again manifested his concern with the problem, "In a 
moral universe, how may the causal transmission of an evil 
tendency be permitted?" How may a hostile inclination of 
will towards God be allowed to be transmitted, for example, 
in the begetting of a vicious son, when, by this inclination, 
the recipient will be judged to stand partly in the wrong even 
before making his first free choice? At stake here for Royce 
was the saving of the unity of his moral universe. In 1888 
Royce wrote only a sketchy reply to this question. 44 
To sum up, by employing six selected sets of marginalia 
to illuminate Royce's letter to james, we hope to have gained 
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a better context and greater accuracy for interpreting how 
Royce had "largely straightened out the big metaphysical 
tangle about continuity, freedom, and the world-formula." 
Having witnessed how his "very simple ... metaphysical 
speculation" through its World of Appreciation illumined 
his question about freedom and the ideals, we now turn to 
see the very expansive nature of this key speculation. Did it 
already enable Royce to recognize the loyal self? And how 
would it affect his interpretation of social and political insti-





Soon after hisAugust 1888landing in California, Royce re-
ported to William James, "The colonies are charming studies 
in human nature and politics, and I return feeling much 
older and wiser-not to add, immensely happier."1 Royce 
felt wiser because by now he had grasped how central to the 
ethical life is faithfulness (or loyalty) and because he had al-
ready rather fully articulated this principle. I base this conser-
vatively stated, though perhaps surprising, claim on his 
1888-1889 writings as compared with his much later Philos-
ophy ofLoyalty (1907). 
Royce had reported that his new "metaphysical specula-
tion" particularly illuminated the "question about Freedom 
and the Ideals."2 Evidently, this special light was at work in 
Royce's 1888 writings where his ideas on loyalty clearly 
emerged as individual threads but not yet as a total fabric. 
Therefore, to guide our survey of texts, we, rather than 
Royce, interweave his threads of 1888 to sum up loyalty as: a 
"homeseeking devotion" whereby one freely commits one-
40 I Ethics of Loyalty 
self to a concrete historical community and subordinates one-
self socially in a nonindividualistic way to "the ideal of a 
good order" with a "cheerful conformity to the general will 
of the community." 3 
To test whether Royce had already in 1888-1891 a rather 
full grasp of loyalty, we will first study what traits emerged in 
his descriptions of the Australians' loyalty to social institu-
tions. We will then examine his sketch of the loyal back-
woodsman whom Royce discovered on his return voyage to 
San Francisco and whom he soon portrayed for Atlantic 
Monthly readers with more than usual care and interest. 
However, to appreciate these two tests, we need a brief intro-
duction to our textual sources, to Royce as ethician, and to 
the role of loyalty within any ethical enterprise. 
Our perhaps surprising claim that Royce already had a 
good grasp ofloyalty in 1888 is based mainly on Royce's long 
article, "Reflections after a Wandering Life in Australasia" 
(which occupied two issues of the Atlantic), and on his ap-
praisal of this article found in a letter to Alfred Deakin.4 He 
looked on his "Reflections" as "the first fruit of my jour-
ney." Modestly and humorously he described the article to 
Deakin as "all ... very superficial," as "addressed to the 
blind by a one-eyed man," and as "the usual omniscient ob-
servations which travellers make on a society that they have 
not had time to see." Although Royce has justly confessed his 
status as a nonexpert in Australian affairs, yet his meaning of 
"very superficial" needs to be measured. If this "superficial" 
is gauged by his easy familiarity with the depths of meta-
physics, such as we recently noticed in the central marginal 
note he penned on Martineau-the note that caught R. B. 
Perry's eye -then, Royce rightly regarded these articles as 
"very superficial." Yet their lighter tone fortunately allowed 
other aspects of Royce's personality to surface, including, it 
seems, his intellectual growth along ethical and political 
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lines-even though Royce considers himself a novice author 
on Australasia who is writing in a popular, nonethical genre 
for the Atlantic's average reader. 
With these warnings in mind, we should also note that in 
1888 Royce did not have to contend with the negative conno-
tations that the term "loyalty" evokes today in some persons. 
To avoid some of these current connotations, we rely, at least 
partially, on Royce's initial terms: "faithfulness" and "hav-
ing faith in the value of faithfulness." Such usage and all his 
remarks about faithfulness (or loyalty) in his "Reflections" 
preceded by almost twenty years his popular Philosophy of 
Loyalty (1907). Yet even before expressing his 1888 grasp of 
faithfulness, Royce had already, since completing his doctor-
al studies, twice taught ethics at Harvard, published three 
major works on ethical themes, and authored half a dozen 
articles on ethics.5 Furthermore, from his earliest boyhood 
writings, he had shown a keen, persistent interest in ethical 
questions. 
In view of these facts, clearly the Royce of the 1888 cruise 
was familiar with, and sensitive to, the basic problems and 
tensions of ethics. He acknowledged that during this cruise 
he focused on "an immediate vital issue of every moment," 
on "a burning problem of life." It is hardly coincidental, 
then, that the ethician Royce should, within a few months, 
write of never "losing faith in the value of faithfulness." 6 
Here he clearly foreshadowed his later 1907 theme, "Be loyal 
to loyalty." 
The ethically experienced Royce of 1888 was familiar, 
then, with the central questions of ethical life concerning 
faithfulness. How does an individual coordinate a fitting in-
dependence with the constructive obedience required by his 
basic social ties? How does a person keep his loyalty from aris-
ing mainly out of spontaneous feelings rather than out of a 
synthesis of courageous intelligence with his feelings? Can 
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loyalty permit intelligence to be sufficiently critical? Can it 
suppon courage for persistently countering the alienating 
forces at work both inside and outside the individual? How 
can one forestall a degradation of loyalty into an impractical 
romantic embrace of all men and all noble causes? How does 
loyal inquiry and commitment generate practical and deter-
minate guidance? Do we occasionally need to show some 
"unfaithfulness" toward those persons who display a habit-
ual lack of fidelity? Can loyalty heal selves of the alienations 
that develop toward institutions and authority figures? If so, 
how is this healing achieved-especially when the fallibility 
and moral failures of institutions and leaders become clear? 
Such an orientation turns us now to Royce's own "Reflec-
tions" for the beginning of his answers to these questions. 
Royce's 1888 expressions about loyalty were occasioned by 
the Australians' tendency to organize their social life highly, 
especially in its nonpolitical areas. In these "Reflections," he 
repeatedly uses the term "loyalty" and often implicitly refers 
to its reality. For example, when generalizing from the Aus-
tralians' attitude towards social institutions as the instru-
ments of their organized communal life, Royce wrote, "Or-
ganization, if it succeeds, does so by virtue of the loyalty of 
the individuals, and the result must be in general normal and 
progressive. "7 As root gives rise to stem and flower, so, ac-
cording to Royce, the faithfulness of individuals gives rise to 
successful organization and thereby to the positive develop-
ment of society. 
He contrasted the loyal Australian way with the "de-
cidedly individualistic," and therefore nonloyal, way of most 
Americans, who exaggerated the emphasis Emerson placed 
on self-reliance and independence and mistakenly imbibed 
as much of the "philosophy of the sacredness of broken ties 
as our sound English common sense would permit us to do." 
He continued his appraisal: "In consequence, we have (not 
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indeed by Emerson's authority) often cultivated flippancy for 
the sake of not seeming to ourselves too submissive to order 
and to social bondage, and have preferred to be rebellious in 
our lives, even if we had to give ourselves the strain and wear 
that lonesome individualism always brings with itself." Yet 
any intelligent person, even while alert to the ever-present 
sins and failings of evolving human organizations, should, 
according to Royce, believe that such organized enterprises 
are the beginnings of a higher social order.8 But the bias of 
many Americans unfortunately drives them to denounce as 
monopoly or as foreign oppression any enterprise that cap-
italists or trade unions organize. Meanwhile, through their 
own "capricious competition," they waste much effort. In 
addition, through their political unconcern, Americans suf-
fer from an apathy that enervates the United States. All this 
weakens the concrete reasonableness ofloyalty. 
But in Australia, "from the outset, such individualism is 
subordinated." For unlike the typical American, the Austra-
lian "has inherited an immense respect for the social order in 
his own way." The components of this order are social insti-
tutions, "our own creatures, our most powerful servants." 
Despite their flaws and partial abuses, we find in them our 
destiny. For this reason we watch closely the Australians, 
who, in Royce's eyes, were characteristically loyal to social in-
stitutions. 
In Royce's "Reflections," what signs reveal this loyalty of 
the Australians? When I reply that there are a dozen such 
signs, the reader deserves a methodological caution. The fol-
lowing marks of loyalty derive substantially from the 1888 
mind of Royce found in his Australasian writings, although I 
am responsible for their ordering. Because I may at first ap-
pear hypersensitive to principles of loyalty in Royce's writ-
ings, an analogy may clarify my position. A person trained in 
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reading fetal photographs may warrantably speak of an "eye-
bud" or "earbud" at certain spots where the ordinary ob-
server detects only the slightest folds of skin. Similarly, the 
loci offered for the twelve following "marks of loyalty" in the 
1888 Royce may at first appear only as explicit as "mere folds 
of skin." 
But let us begin our search for marks of loyalty by recall-
ing how impressed Royce was by the success with which the 
Australians usually balanced their sense of personal freedom 
and their serious recognition of the social order. One of the 
many factors entering into this balance was their recognition 
of a common heritage, home, and history. We may take, 
then, as a first mark of loyalty a shared sense of common 
bonds as already experienced. 
Independent through their geographical and historical 
isolation, the Australians still remained tied in many ways to 
their heritage of British civilization. They also had a common 
sense of their great continent as a basic life-source and as a 
challenge for all. Furthermore, they shared jointly in their 
common past history; they sensed how their present con-
dition depended on the deeds and dedication of the earlier 
frontiersmen, settlers, miners, and government officials. 9 
Moreover, Royce later described the elder Australians as "gen-
erally loyal to tradition; lovers often of the Church of their fa-
thers . . . faithful to the mother-country, proud of the Brit-
ish connection." 10 Such was their shared sense of common 
roots in the past. 
Secondly, their loyalty was marked by a shared sense of a 
concrete common hope. Some Australians "carried about 
. . . the ideal of a good order," to be realized in their shared 
life and land.11 As a common task their coastal slopes, rugged 
mountains, and formidable desert challenged them contin-
uously. Most of them, according to Royce, also hoped for an 
eventual federation of their colonies into one nation. Such 
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hopes, setting a healthy idealism aglow in the Australians, 
were preserved from a vain romanticism by a business sense 
that disciplined these hopes into practical deeds. 
Besides a feeling for their common past and common 
hopes, the Australians possessed a third ingredient of loyalty, 
one already mentioned and one that steadied them in the 
present-namely, an "immense respect for the social order 
itself" They saw how large and complex was the social order 
developing in their land and consequently, according to 
Royce, showed "a degree of conservatism." Thus, although 
they cherished their own forms of personal private liberty, 
the Australians demonstrated "a great love for social ties," 
both interpersonal and institutional. Rooted in a faith in the 
value of faithfulness itself, this conservative love tended to 
bring their common ideals and purposes to further realiza-
tion.12 
It becomes obvious, then, why their faith embodied itself 
in shared agreements about the future cooperative deeds 
which they pledged to, and expected of, one another. "After 
all," Royce soon asked, "are not social ties the glory of ratio-
nal human life?" 13 At the individual level, such mutual 
agreements materialized in the social ties of contracts and 
covenants; at the provincial level, in confederation agree-
ments, then under way; and at the international level, "in 
sharing the ideals and work of humanity" in practical ways 
that eventually would achieve legal form. Royce offered ex-
amples of other "institutionalized social ties" that the Aus-
tralians loved: trade unions, new commercial and cultural 
enterprises, extensive leagues of amateur sports, municipal 
systems for street building and refuse removal, and socially 
alert newspapers. The elaborate social order in Australia was 
something calling for immense respect, for some conserva-
tism, and for an avoidance of flippancy. As a balance against 
those eager for quick, drastic legislative changes, Royce 
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pointed to "such a wealth of political duties as forces a com-
munity to move deliberately and cautiously. "14 
Fourthly, the Australians' loyalty showed "a degree 
. . . of public spirit," an awareness of belonging to a group 
life greater than one's private life. As an example of such re-
sponsibility to the community Royce instanced the Austra-
lian press as generally far more alert to its role than American 
papers, for it provided a balanced account of news and issues, 
mediated through a more critically refined editorial judg-
ment.l5 The inner thrust of loyalty tended to lift one out of 
his narrowly private interests. If Americans were more public-
spirited, they would recognize the basically good roots of 
social evolution in the nation's best efforts at organized free-
dom. If so, they would not immediately tend to condemn 
the formation of a trade union or the merger of businesses as 
something hostile, but would recognize such a step as a sym-
bol of their own best interests. 
Forestalling an inherited rebelliousness against the social 
order and against a public spirit responsible for this order, 
Royce mentioned "a degree . . . of social discipline." We 
can take this as a fifth mark of loyalty. If the group's basic co-
operative needs are to be achieved, it needs to discipline its 
members by approval or disapproval. Twenty-two years 
earlier, at Lincoln Grammar School in San Francisco, about a 
thousand boys had, in an "impressively disciplinary and per-
sistent" way, introduced a quaint, countrified lad called 
Josiah to the demands of their group consensus-or, as he 
later phrased it, to the "majesty of the community."16 Now· 
he appreciated how the Australians both expected and ac-
cepted strong government action promptly exercised in time 
of urgent needs and crises. From their youth they were 
trained to the social discipline needed to maintain and ad-
vance the social order. Perhaps one had served as a crewman 
on a ship and another as a· member of a sporting team; thus 
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each learned the need for disciplined cooperative actions if 
the group was to survive decently. 
Sixthly, loyalty is marked by "a degree . . . of cheerful 
conformity to the general will of the community." For a 
community to exist and to secure basic cooperation, a consen-
sus on certain fundamental values has to be achieved. Royce 
found that the Australians had created more than a minimal 
consensus, thanks mainly to their common heritage. Their 
membership in the British Empire "exists by virtue of a 
general good-will and because it is at present the most conve-
nient fashion of life for all parties. "17 So any calls for imme-
diate independence were simply rash. 
He also discovered during his stay there that on the occa-
sion of the Chinese agitation, the "Australian public was of 
one mind that Chinese immigration must be discouraged. 18 
Such uniformity of the Australian general will did not oper-
ate solely upon minority groups inside Australia to evoke 
their basic conformity to the majority; like all expressions of a 
community's general will, it also called upon outside groups 
-the British government, other colonies, other nations-re-
spectfully to recognize its consensus. "Downing Street" and 
the Chinese nation should respectfully recognize this general 
will. 
Not incidentally, Royce required that this conformity be 
cheerful. For both loyalty and the community were in trouble 
when the basic pleasantness seeped out of social cooperation, 
and especially when the needed conformity was only reluc-
tantly offered or even coercively imposed-as had happened 
to the pro-Chinese groups in the recent agitation. In Royce's 
sense of loyalty, a bored or bitter spirit did not qualify. 
On the other hand, as we saw, Royce thought some 
Americans lacked a degree of conformity to the genuine will 
of their nation. For in the emergent forms of organized en-
terprise, they failed to recognize genuine expressions of their 
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own best interests, the " beginnings of a higher social order. " 
Perceptible abuses in some enterprises and the American her-
itage of rebelliousness led to this partial blindness. Hence, 
many Americans often disloyally tended to disassociate 
themselves from social endeavors which by organizing their 
freedom aimed to carry out the people's general will. On this 
point, Royce found the Australians more loyal. 
If one is to take part in the community's general will, an 
indispensable step is to adopt a cause in common. Already in 
1888, Royce used the term "cause" to refer to the objective 
of loyalty. This came close to his 1907 meaning of an ob-
jective superindividual value, personally treasured and 
served.19 He wrote popularly of Englishmen on holiday who 
often display a common readiness "to speak for a noble 
cause." Yet causes were more than topics for picnics, for 
achievement of the ideal events of our hopes is usually at-
tained through nonholiday situations. Royce found at 
Sydney, for instance, some leaders from Victoria who 
belonged to a "union intended to promote the cause of the 
federation of the colonies. "20 Their cause of federation served 
as a dynamic interest that united and strengthened them, 
especially in confronting the colonial dangers of excessive 
provincialism and of too-hasty, overactive, political organiza-
tion. Royce found "the chief hope of Australia must lie in 
the federation of her now disunited communities." Beyond 
federation, he saw the lure of eventual independence from 
Britain emerging as a cause. This would happen because of 
Australia's unique calling in the South Pacific. Moreover, 
Royce found that the Australian backwoodsman of his return 
trip to San Francisco had never lost "faith in the value of 
faithfulness" and that this was the cause to which the man 
dedicated "his courageous idealism."21 By adopting such a 
cause, his friend entered the community of those holding the 
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moral insight-or, as is said today, "the moral point of 
. , 
v1ew. 
Adopting an order of preference for settling conflicts of 
loyalty is an eighth mark of loyalty. Already in 1888, Royce 
was settling future conflicts of loyalty.22 He then faced the 
issue that in the not too distant future the question of Chi-
nese immigration would make the Australians' loyalty to 
their own national development conflict with their loyalty to 
the British Empire. In such a situation, he recommended 
that the Australians terminate their empire connection in a 
firm and friendly way. For both communities, he said, "will 
serve humanity best by parting company, not in enmity, but 
in faithful pursuit of their very different callings." With all 
men they shared the common cause of humanity. With other 
members of the empire, they shared the common cause of 
British commerce and civilization. But for the Australians, 
their own people was a common cause that called for deeper 
attachment than did the imperial cause. For though numer-
ically larger, the empire was only a cultural politicoeconomic 
organization, not a people. Accordingly, Royce wrote, "The 
deeper loyalty of the Australian must always be to his own 
people." Royce's order of preference placed primacy on a fit-
ting loyalty to oneself and one's unique calling within one's · 
own people and its calling. He closed his "Refections" reem-
phasizing this point: "We all work best abroad when we first 
possess our own homes in peace. "23 So Royce's loyalty pos-
sessed a healthy pragmatism through its use of this order of 
preference. Thus he evaluated causes for their priorities with-
in decision making and he forestalled any tendency merely to 
gaze at starry ideals. 
Loyalty is also marked by courage and patience in the 
struggle and striving that devoted service requires. Very char-
acteristically Royce highlighted the endurance and bravery of 
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the Australian frontiersman struggling against the desert. He 
also clearly admired the sense of skillful contest shown by 
Deakin and other governmental officials-provided that they 
acted as genuinely responsible ministers of the people and 
not as mere managers seeking their own ends. He treasured 
any Australian who was "loyally disposed to rear . . . the 
ideal of a good order" amid indifferent or even hostile per-
sons. Amid disorderly feelings and forces, loyalty called for a 
patient, courageous maintenance and development not only 
of moral order in the individual but also of political order in 
organized society. 24 
Royce touched on another mark of loyalty: the balancing 
role of justice in our interactions with other communities. In 
the work of world development, we are to do our share and 
make sure to balance what we take by what we give. Since 
this note strikes contemporary ears with special relevance, 
one wishes the 1888 Royce had developed the theme of jus-
tice. He did see that "to keep pace with the world's mental 
work" was a sine qua non for civilized development and that 
such pace-keeping requires of any nation that it be effectively 
fair when reaching out to other peoples and lands. Long be-
fore] ohn Dewey made "interaction" the heart of his instru-
mentalism, Royce specifically mentioned the idea, without 
developing it: ". . . the true relation of foreign lands is one 
of interaction. When we do our share of the world's work, 
and give while we take, then only are we mentally alive." 25 
With his "only" here, Royce inserted an exacting condition 
for being mentally alive. But he was convinced that one's 
duty in the world community required that each employ his 
time and talents well. Only if we will to "give while we 
take," can our interactions be fair and balanced.26 In Royce's 
not fully articulated "will to work justice" in our interac-
tions, we discern how far beyond mere sentiment he was. 
Sentiment may be part of Royce's 1888 grasp of loyalty, as 
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when he wrote of the colonists' "mere sentiment of imperial 
loyalty [to the crown]."27 But the operative demand upon 
oneself to contribute as much as one receives goes beyond 
sentiment. Thus, for example, if the crown required itself to 
contribute as much to the colonies' eventual independence as 
it demanded from them for its own welfare, then it would 
will the justice required by loyalty. Such a stress on balance in 
the intricate life of loyalty reveals itself, interestingly enough, 
in this and the two following traits ofloyalty. 
Balancing a catholicity of intent and of receptivity with a 
realistic sense of one's concrete limits is an eleventh mark of 
loyalty. On the one hand, loyalty requires a universalism of a 
generous intent towards all persons and a universalism of an 
accepting openness to various influences and ideas. Some 
Australians were rightly concerned for all the world's peo-
ples. Yet others voiced the motto, "Australia for the Austra-
lians!" If they lived their motto in sheer exclusivism, Royce 
taught, these latter would eventually dehumanize them-
selves. For them the challenge was to interpret their motto 
open-endedly; that is, in "its true meaning, as implying also, 
'and the Australians for mankind.' " 28 
Similarly, if they were to be influenced by the gifts of all 
peoples, the Australians needed a catholicity of receptivity. 
Indeed, Royce here found a necessary condition for effective 
freedom. For he thought it almost inevitable that for a long 
period, "the Australian youth will not care for that close in-
tercourse with the world which alone can make them free-
men" (emphasis added). Some Australians, unfortunately, 
tended to be excessively nationalistic, and "to feel indifferent 
towards all influences from other parts of the world." Expect-
ably, Royce interpreted this lack of receptive catholicity as a 
philosopher would. He taught that the Australians partic-
ularly needed to be concerned with the whole course of mod-
ern thought in its broad spectrum. They should sharply 
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counter "a provincial self-consciousness [that] will tend more 
and more to fight against the vast industry required to keep 
pace with the world's mental work." 29 
On the other hand, Royce balanced this universalism 
with a strong stress on local self-determination. In their prac-
tical priorities, the Australians needed to recognize their own 
unique destiny and concrete limits. Thus a reader of Royce, 
with head still echoing from the earlier idea of "the Austra-
lians for mankind," may be slightly jarred by his conclusion. 
For without opening the door to narrow provincialism, Royce 
inserted a significant "first of all claim" as he brought his 
"Reflections" to a close: " ... our [Australian] brethren of 
the other hemisphere will serve all mankind by claiming first 
of all their Australia 'for the Australians.' "3° That he fa-
vored their loyalty "beginning at home" is seen in his 
approval of tendencies towards local independence from Brit-
ain.31 He nodded to the contention of the Queensland minis-
try that no governor should be appointed representing the 
crown unless he should previously have been discovered ac-
ceptable to the Australians. He was opposed to "Downing 
Street" making a final determination of Australian policy on 
the Chinese question. "In the long run," wrote Royce, "Aus-
tralia must make its own Chinese policy, and the empire 
must conform thereto." 32 A so-called "Chinese Agitation" 
occurred during Royce's stay in Australia. He viewed it as a 
symbol of the need that all involved recognize the healthy in-
stinct and justifiable and permanent sentiment of the Aus-
tralian public. 
Futhermore, if the Australians were to appreciate their 
own unique calling and destiny, they would have to attain a 
certain partial freedom from their traditions, heritage, and 
other outside influences. Since, in Royce's view, "the young 
Australian party" was "no doubt the beginning of the party 
of the future of Australia," Australians might for a while 
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have to postpone studying the ideas of other peoples.33 In 
such ways, then, Royce instanced his balancing of universal-
ism and a realistic sense of authentic provincialism. 
Finally, loyalty requires the balance of independent self 
reliance, as Royce's sketch of his friendly backwoodsman, the 
"loyal and yet self-reliant character" will soon show. A coreq-
uisite for a faith in others is a fitting faith in oneself. This 
Roycean theme was already foreshadowed in his 1879 "Med-
itation before the Gate. "34 There Royce's self-dedication to 
philosophy was marked by earnestness, independence, and 
reverence. Similarly in "Reflections," the phrase "organized 
freedom" suggests the same paradoxical balance of a genuine 
independence and autonomy which is nonetheless directed 
by a community's presence and influence. When one com-
mits oneself through loyalty to the common object of a 
cause, a self is stretched to something beyond his individual-
istic self and tied into a community of similar cointenders 
and coappreciators. On the other hand, only when a person 
comes into touch with his individual calling and destiny 
through autonomy and self-reliance can he fulfill the unique 
role he is to play in the community. Accordingly, the balance 
of the two corequisites is essential to the Roycean moral self 
of 1888. 
In summary review, then, we have indicated a dozen 
characteristics of loyalty, as exemplified in Royce's descrip-
tions of the Australians' attitude to social institutions. In 
1888 he perceived the loyal self as having a shared sense of 
past common bonds and of concrete common hopes together 
with an immense respect for the social order. Because of this, 
the loyal self achieved a high degree of public spirit, of social 
discipline, and of cheerful conformity to the general will of 
the community. For these reasons the loyal self could adopt a 
common cause, determine an order of preference for settling 
conflicts of loyalty, cultivate courage and patience in the 
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struggle, and develop a threefold dynamic to secure bal-
ance-of justice in our interactions, of catholicity with lim-
itations, and of loyalty with self-reliance. I believe that in 
1888 Royce explicitly articulated these twelve marks of loyal-
ty or at least brought them so near the surface of expression 
that he provided clear hints about the direction his later doc-
trine on loyalty would take. 
Accordingly, I see his 1888 view of loyalty as rather well 
developed. It already exhibited most of the ingredients pro-
posed in his 1907 Phtlosophy of Loyalty, though it lacked 
many of the ingredients that emerged only in the trans-
formed ethics of his final years.35 Thanks to his transforming 
insight into Peirce, which began in 1912, Royce's maturest 
doctrine on loyalty (1915-1916) would operate on a new 
level. Logically, it would replace dyadic relations with triadic 
ones, use the epsilon relation to articulate itself, and by 
claiming fallibility, call for continuing efforts at reinterpreta-
tion. In content, it would exhibit a dialectic of estrangements 
and reconciliations, three kinds of estrangements and loyal-
ties, and a paradoxical law (the greater union of selves occurs 
by way of their greater individualization). Surely, a second 
and later study is needed to validate the claims just made so 
apodictically. Meanwhile, however, may we simply indicate 
that many of his 1915-1916 insights into loyalty were not yet 
present in his 1888 view? Nor would they be present even in 
1907. Nevertheless, this 1888-1891 articulation of loyalty 
contained most of the 1907 principles that would be used as 
the basis for the 1912-1916 advance to Royce's fullest philos-
ophy of loyalty. 
For Royce in 1888, however, loyalty was already more 
than a term with certain marks. When bonded with self-reli-
ance, it meant authentic moral life. Steaming homeward on 
the Alameda, Royce met a man who almost personified loyal-
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ty. Royce portrayed this European who had pioneered in the 
backcountry of Australia as a "specimen of the true Austra-
lian bushman, of the more intellectual type," "an amusing 
and excellent fellow, Welch by name," "at heart he was a 
very good fellow, who could never knowingly utter a mean 
thing. "36 Hence, when Royce in his "Reflections" sought an 
authentic representative of the capacity and promise of the 
Australian nation, he turned to this frontiersman and man of 
the people, rather than to students or to literary writers.H Ac-
cordingly, to appreciate Royce's 1888 philosophic outline of 
the loyal yet fittingly independent self, we closely observe the 
cameo he drew when describing his blunt and vigorous com-
panion on the Alameda. · 
Royce's unforgettable friend was a self-made man, "a 
good way past middle life, but still full of vigor and quick of 
wits." He had been "in early youth a naval officer," and 
"passed many years in the bush as explorer, adventurer, and 
country-newspaper editor." His was a life of continuous striv-
ing, of searching out survivors, and of fighting political bat-
tles. What Royce most noticed in him was his courageous 
idealism. He "had passed through all the bitterness of a long 
and hard life without ever losing faith in the value of faith-
fulness. "38 Such painful experiences taught him "he could 
not believe in many men; but he did believe in human life." 
He was one "who in youth had known the discipline of a 
quarterdeck and who had ever since carried about, in a faith-
less world, the ideal of a good order, which somehow nobody 
near him seemed to be loyally disposed to rear." In this text, 
a new aspect of Royce's 1888 view of the loyal self emerges. 
"The ideal of a good order" seems to refer more to the so-
cietal ideal of orderly cooperation for the common good than 
to one's personal ideal of a consistent life plan. Royce ad-
mired the self who constantly held on to such an ideal, who 
steadily carried it out, and who remained undaunted in rais-
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ing this standard even when experiencing that many around 
him appeared uncommitted to the ideal. Moral excellence set 
one at odds with those ignoring, or even disbelieving, both 
the call and the demands of the common good. Such would 
be greedy businessmen or grossly selfish workingmen or 
venal politicians. 
What Royce particularly admired in this backwoodsman 
was his intellectual questing and honesty. "He looked for 
signs of truth in his world as he would have looked for signs 
of distant water in the bush" was Royce's accurate description 
set in local color. The will to truth, so characteristic of Royce 
in the 1870s and 1880s, here became a basic and indispens-
able dynamism in the loyal self. This included an open hon-
esty towards others which precludes such mask-wearing as 
hinders authenticity or alienates others. Royce saw that this 
frontiersman's "judgments were meanwhile all his own. . . . 
He was as honest a man as he was blunt." Finally, despite his 
open criticism of sham aristocrats and time-serving officials, 
the backwoodsman showed a true patriotism. 
In brief, Royce confessed, "I found in him a more strong-
ly defined, loyal, and yet self-reliant character than I had met 
on my travels for a long time." The unforgettable friend of 
the Alameda had created an outstanding moral balance by 
blending the independent use of his own resources with a 
committed faithfulness to his better self, his country, and his 
people. In this Australian Royce recognized the long-sought 
touchstone of his later ethics. His enlivened mind, having 
sketched out these lines of the loyal self as gathered here, 
would itself gather these hints for the developed doctrine 
which, with some omissions needed for popularization, di-






W have explored Royce's 1888 development in meta-
physics and morals. What remain to be investigated are his 
writings in social and political philosophy. Here a first read-
ing may fascinate easily rather than inform accurately. Only 
gradually, through repeated thoughtful readings, does one 
discover that Royce's ideas in these areas are more carefully 
articulated and complex than one had at first suspected. 
But the way in which Royce then dealt with sociopolitical 
questions deserves notice before we attempt to describe and 
evaluate his conclusions. He set as his aim "to become ac-
quainted with the drift and the forces of Australasian life." 1 
This intent breathed a healthy evolutionary positivism into 
his method. He resisted taking schemes from some a priori 
political science or sociology and reading Australia in their 
light. Rather, he searched empirically for the special factors 
at work in the evolving organization of the colonies' political 
and social life. 2 His sources included his personal on-the-
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scene observations and the dialectic of contrary political 
opinions such as Alfred Deakin and Sir Saul Samuel pro-
posed to him. But his primary source was the experience and 
reflection of others insofar as current Australian literature 
brought these to his alert notice.3 Besides official documents 
and books on Australia, Royce found particular help in Aus-
tralia's expertly edited, encyclopedic newspapers. Yet, de-
spite continued readings, he frankly admitted that his own 
writings on Australia were never more than mere opinions, 
"stray impressions and reflections" by a wanderer. 
Royce was convinced that the colonies' current social and 
political life could not be well understood unless one grasped 
how it had been shaped by geography, climate, and history. 
By sketching these, he gave a sense of realism and evolution 
to his initial account. In Australia's particularly monotonous, 
weird, and even forbidding natural environment, a different 
kind of frontiersman developed than in California: the 
"Aussie," independent, self-reliant, and loyal, like the Aus-
tralian backwoodsman who so fascinated Royce. The col-
onists' thinking was determined by the challenge, problem, 
and hope of their frontier. For, except in the limited coastal 
areas, Australia's agricultural growth depended upon re-
claiming semidesert lands or the desert itself. 
Amazing patience and courage arose in a Wentworth, an 
Oxley, a Stuart, and in other explorers of the colonies. Royce 
felt that such sturdy souls "found an empire, and that too 
even where they personally felt the most disappointment 
with their discovery. "4 By their efforts they enriched others' 
lives, even though they did not achieve their own purposes 
and plans. In this way they exemplified what a later Royce 
would call" giving oneself to a lost cause." 
Thanks to the frontiersmen's persevering efforts, a set of 
skills was gradually developed which made agriculture and 
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other industries possible. Colonists found grazing value in 
grasses once thought useless. They invented techniques to 
convert lands once thought barren into gardens and produc-
tive fields. Drought forced them gradually to recognize what 
treasure lay under their feet-springs, cave streams, and 
wells, even in the desert. By such arts Australia's high poten-
tial for agriculture and mining was harnessed. Royce summed 
up these accomplishments: "As a result of the war with the 
desert, and as an outcome of the wealth of successful stock-
raisers, farmers, and miners, we have at length the growing 
Australian civilization of today." 5 
On these foundations the Australians raised an elaborate 
social organization. It deeply impressed our American visitor 
-both in its political and in its nonpolitical forms.6 Among 
the latter, he found it remarkably promising that in the col-
onies of Australia so many amateurs engaged so extensively 
in sports. He noted that this evoked a strong sense of com-
munity identification within clubs, groups, and colonies. 
Unlike our American hiring of professionals as our gladi-
ators, the Australians had their groups' picked representa-
tives. Thus, said Royce, "the people take warm interest, be-
cause it is the people who are carrying on the contest." 7 
If the "overtasked" professor, who had come to the South 
Seas for a cure, was impressed by the Australians' "love of 
healthy exercise and of sport," so, too, was he struck by their 
more relaxed pace of life which lacked "some of the elements 
of strain and worry that make our own [American] life bear so 
hard upon our constitutions. Competition is severe [in Aus-
tralia] but not so merciless to the individual as with us." 8 
Royce felt that the Australians would undergo more pressure 
as population grew and life's problems multiplied. Yet their 
enthusiasm for the outdoors and their trend to close social or-
ganization would safeguard them. 
Another promising feature was the individual colonist's 
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loyalty to nonpolitical social institutions. Royce viewed this 
loyalty as the seed of success in such organizations. Unlike 
the "flippancy, irresponsibility, and rebelliousness" of the 
Californians of 1888, the colonists manifested "a degree of 
conservation, of public spirit, of social discipline, [and] of 
cheerful conformity to the general will of the community. "9 
Royce implied that by accepting the importance of organized 
association, the loyal colonists, unlike many Americans, 
made a value judgment that was indispensable for maintain-
ing a community. 
During his forty years of teaching, Royce showed great re-
serve about publicly expressing his political philosophy. 10 
That he broke this silence once with his Australian articles 
makes them especially significant. In "Reflections" he men-
tioned that the three topics of his political conversations with 
Deakin were: 1) the colonies' systems of responsible govern-
ment, 2) the issue of colonial federation, and 3) the political 
future of Australasia. 11 These give us three dimensions of 
Royce's 1888 political thought. In all three he is distinctively 
concerned to locate the psychological conditions that render 
the relations between citizens fit or unfit. A similar interest 
controls his study of relations between citizens and their gov-
ernmental ministers, or among these ministers themselves. 
Royce gave less attention to the colonists' imperial relation-
ship to "Downing Street," except to note the colonists' 
growing independence of the crown. Though not marshaled 
together under his 1913 rubric of the "conditions required 
for the consciousness of community," Royce's 1888 emphasis 
on the psychological conditions for healthy political con-
sciousness seems to foreshadow his later heuristic approach. 12 
Royce presented the facts, made contrasts with America, 
and evaluated. We follow his order. Mter a sketch of the col-
onies' geography and history, he focused on their current po-
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litical situation. He was struck by how rapidly the colonies 
had developed their political organizations and how new 
some of their forms were. To his knowledge, these were the 
only pure democracies of British origin that now showed 
suongly socialist tendencies. For example, state ownership of 
the railways had existed from the start of the colonies. Royce 
asked what factors had tended to produce these habits of 
mind in people ofEnglish origin.l3 He noted, moreover, that 
the Ausualians' socialistic uend moved directly into econom-
ics and commerce. Among Americans, if socialist concern op-
erated, it avoided government ownership of business, and 
moved along philanthropic lines of health, education, and 
welfare. 
Royce more fully described Ausualian political life in his 
"Impressions. "14 Since the Ausualians frequently heard po-
litical speeches, they were continually agitated by state issues. 
Because their local government affairs seized their daily con-
cern most suongly, the colonists focused narrowly on their 
own sparsely populated colony and felt an intense patriotism 
toward it. Furthermore, two factors usually speeded up the 
colonists' political machinery in its making and enforcing of 
laws. The people habitually and readily expressed their will. 
Then, too, their government ministers promptly uanslated 
the popular will into law because otherwise this same will 
might swiftly remove them from their untenured office. 
The price of such mobility could be high at times. Being 
always on uial, the prime minister used up much time de-
fending his party's actions before the colonial parliament. If 
his term had been fixed, as in American government, he 
could have better invested this time to design laws more ac-
curately and to administer them more carefully. On the other 
hand, admittedly, he had less trouble from organized labor 
in the colonies that did his peer in America. For in Australia 
labor unions were committed to the general good rather than 
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to a primary pursuit of their own interests. Hence, unlike 
American labor unions, they did not endanger the govern-
ment. Fortunately, too, the Australians' nonpolitical organi-
zation was elaborate and thus worked as a mighty resistance 
against the trends toward precipitous lawmaking and· dem-
agoguery latent in the colonists' governmental systems. 
But what historical factors chiefly contributed to develop 
such responsible governmental balance in these colonial sys-
tems? After a survey of the histories of New South Wales and 
Victoria, Royce pointed out that from the very beginning of 
these colonies, the government's position had been strong: 
"The organization of Crown colonies long preceded the com-
ing of the mass of their population. "15 This led the colonists 
to expect strong governmental action if disorders arose. For 
example, when miners rioted at Ballarat in 1854, strong gov-
ernment forces imposed on them the will of organized soci-
ety. By contrast, during the great riots in California's mining 
districts, miners feuded against rival miners, while a "delib-
erately incompetent political organization" lifted not a fin-
ger to stop them.16 For the initial posture of Americans was 
one of suspicion toward government intervention. But in 
Australia, the colonists had a frank, intelligent confidence in 
the state's power for doing them much good. Reciprocally, 
governmental officials felt it their duty to answer the popular 
needs. 
Royce emphasized that the government's initial position 
of strength reenforced the people in their esteem of the polit-
ical order and evoked from them certain expectations and 
demands. Since they found their government backing up or-
ganized society against industrial forces disruptive of the 
economic whole, the people learned to accept active govern-
mental entry into the business sector. Their basic perceptions 
of each other established their reciprocal roles. Thus the Aus-
tralians saw their government primarily as a promoter of the 
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economic order, whereas the Americans, sensing in govern-
ment a possible interferer with free enterprise, adopted a de-
fensive posture of "keep out." Royce's overall picture may 
serve to summarize: "Our early statesmen in this country 
used to fear nothing so much as the European tyrants who, 
no doubt, were longing to get at our liberties; hence our early 
tendency was mainly toward whatever secured popular free-
dom and checked the powers above. The Australian leader is 
nowadays thinking, it would seem, of nothing so much as of 
some new social tie by which he may persuade the popular 
will to bind itself. Mter all, are not social ties the glory of ra-
tional human life?" 11 
Besides strength, Royce pointed to "closeness" as a sec-
ond cause in the colonists' development of a responsible 
political system. He put i~ dearly: "In Australia ... the sub-
ject is always nearer to the State than he is with us, and that 
not merely because his State is a small province. Responsible 
ministerial government makes it always 'presidential year' 
with him, to use our own phrase. And the political eagerness 
of the people is not yet blunted, as with us, by the habitual 
cheapening of the issues of politics. "18 Numerically, psy-
chologically, and morally the Australian was nearer to the 
state. Compared to the population of most American states, 
the small number of citizens in his own colony facilitated a 
sense of familiarity. Psychologically he was more involved be-
cause he felt more risk and power. Economics touched the 
colonist closely, yet few were more heavily involved in eco-
nomics that his government. So when changes impended in 
governmental personnel or policies, the Australian experi-
enced a heightened sense of risk. Accordingly he felt morally 
more obliged to regulate the government promptly and to 
face deep issues honestly, rather than to sidestep them for 
fear of stepping on the toes of vested interests.19 Thus the 
Australians whom Royce interviewed actually found it hard 
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to understand Americans' widespread lack of concern for 
their government's actions. In sum, Royce stressed that the 
different degrees of closeness between citizen and govern-
ment make governments act differently. 
Successful nonpolitical communities in Australia were 
built on loyalty, as we saw. But political organization-
whether in the colonies, America, or elsewhere-is usually 
built on coercion.20 Along with strength and closeness, then, 
coercion may be viewed as a third cause of the colonies' de-
veloping political systems. Royce pointed out a balanc~ of 
coercions here. For those who possess state power, it is more 
expeditious to do things their own way, even if it means com-
mitting uncommitted majorities or pushing reluctant minor-
ities. Meanwhile the Australian voters coerce their ministers 
by expecting to control both governmental policy-making 
and their ministers' duration in office. Because the voters' 
economic concern for governmental business activity is high, 
ministers feel forced to promise unfulfillable favors or to pro-
vide short-term placebos if they are to get elected or to stay in 
office. Here the Americans enjoyed a lesser degree of coer-
cion, thanks to their reduced concern. 
By these contrasts, Royce showed that the different com-
munal consciousnesses of various peoples evoke different de-
grees of responsibility in governments. If one people frankly 
and confidently expects helpful services from its government, 
then an actively involved government emerges. But if an-
other people jealously suspects the government of filching 
individual liberties and eagerly shows hostility against gov-
ernment intervention in economics, then a less active and less 
responsive ministry arises. Moreover, to the degree that both 
a people and its government ministers are more closely and 
tightly bound together in experiencing shared risks, to that 
degree do both become more responsible. By contrast, if cit-
izens and officials are related more loosely, distantly, and 
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apathetically to each other, they invite irresponsibility and 
tend to cheapen political issues. 
Similarly, a people's expectations largely determine the 
qualities of its ministers. If Americans elect officials less qual-
ified than an Alfred Deakin, then, suggested Royce, they get 
what they expect and deserve.21 In the political cockpits of 
the colonies, a minister cannot last unless he is well trained in 
public affairs. He must be persistently resourceful and per-
suasive, as well as sensitive and plastic to the people's needs. 
Towards his many adroit rival politicians, he must exhibit 
tact rather than pugnaciousness. As "the good fencer," he 
must be a "graceful and pleasing artist," who leads the peo-
ple and earnestly ministers to them. He must never descend 
to the role of a squabbling manager, or of an uncompromis-
ing prophet who stops the political process. He needs to bal-
ance his highly developed intelligence with his long practical 
training. Otherwise, he will either allow "abstract, vainly 
idealistic" theories to turn his head or permit the press of 
agenda to transform him into a mere bargainer. "In short," 
wrote Royce of government ministers, "they will be not only 
men of large ideas but men of business, ... accustomed to 
feel the popular pulse, and conscious of the limitations of 
their practical life." Rather than fulminating and agitating 
rashly, as Sir Henry Parkes did when faced with the Chinese 
question in 1888, they will employ discretion concerning 
whether to speak, and if so, when and with what moderation 
and caution.22 Royce, having surveyed the psychological con-
ditions at work in the colonial political systems and in their 
government ministers, concluded with the wish that "our 
[American] public life were as certain to combine these im-
portant qualities in its ministers." 
After this survey, Royce moved to evaluate the Austra-
lians' political systems. He found himself first raising some 
questions, then clarifying state socialism for himself, and fi-
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nally focusing on two dangers and their remedies. The con-
trast between the Australians' involvement in government 
and the Americans' widespread apathy towards it raised one 
question that Royce left unsolved. What degree of risk and 
fear do citizens need to experience if they are to participate 
actively in government? When concluding the first install-
ment of "Reflections," Royce sounded his second central and 
unsolved question.23 How can a people hold the executive to 
that degree of responsibility which the needs of the people 
require, and yet grant him enough stability in office to es-
cape the temptation of pushing drastic legislation through 
the assembly? Royce knew that to strike the balance wisely 
would benefit both Australian and American governments. 
In the colonies he encountered a special kind of state so-
cialism that prodded him to clarify his thinking with sever-
al significant distinctions. These reveal his efforts to sift 
through the altered conditions within the history of Austra-
lian colonial governments, and then to evaluate political sys-
tems accordingly. Thus he wrote: "An existing government, 
... a 'strong' government, found itself at first much embar-
rassed by the new-coming miners, undertook from the outset 
to regulate the use of the mines, was obliged to keep pace in 
its growth with the mainly economic needs of the country, 
and has so remained, ever since, the central object of social 
interest in the colonial mind. "24 In this way the correlative 
mentalities of the people and the government initiated and 
increased politically organized socialism in the colonies. 
With Royce, we can distinguish the mode of origin, the drift, 
and the level of Australian socialism. 
First, state socialism may emerge naturally in accord with 
a people's genuine needs and temperament. But it can also 
be artificially imposed in accord with a design of a "Franken-
stein sort. "25 Our American moves towards a protective tariff 
system and interstate commerce legislation were natural 
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enough and, according to Royce, not even close to state social-
ism.26 Turning to the Australians' genuine state socialisms, 
however, he deeply suspected and dreaded that their types 
were too artificially designed "out of dead theories." They 
did not seem to him naturally faithful to emergent needs. 
Secondly, the main concern or "drift" of socialistic think-
ers in America and in Australia was different. As Royce 
described it: "Our [American] state socialists are generally 
philanthropists rather than men of business, and desire more 
to take care of the subject's soul and stomach than to carry his 
goods to market. But in the colonies the drift is the other 
way. The state is first in every man's thought, and its pur-
poses are commercial rather than philanthropic." 27 The 
social thrust of the American government spent itself mainly 
in health, education, and welfare; it was heavily restricted 
from direct engagement in business. But the colonial 
governments were primarily economic and only philanthopic 
in a derivative way. With most Americans, Royce believed 
that state socialists of the "mainly economic" type could do 
"more serious mischief" than the "mainly philanthropic" 
breed. 
Lastly, Royce distinguished state socialism as found at its 
theoretical and practical levels. Henry George's Progress and 
Poverty {1879) was an example of socialism at the abstract 
level. Royce regarded it as "shadowy," and thought of those 
who engage in socialist theories as "vainly idealistic" and 
even perhaps "mildly dangerous. "28 Quite different was Al-
fred Deakin's practical art of socialistic governing. Deakin, in 
touch with the popular will and the interests of the various 
parties, was alert to current possibilities and their practical 
limits. He constantly tested whether certain steps were pre-
mature or timely. Yet Royce had his reservations even with 
socialism taken simply as a practical art. Deakin's skills as a 
socialist minister puzzled Royce. He suspected that Deakin's 
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methods of cabinet government were "too officious," that 
Deakin tended to fritter away time and energies in squabbles 
over trifles, and that he needed some brake-as yet unde-
vised-against "quick drastic legislation." 29 
In sum, then, Royce distinguished six varieties of state so-
cialism, according to origin, drift, and level. On none of 
them did he intend to render a final verdict. His examination 
of the Australians' experiments in socialism led him to clarify 
his thought on the topic and to adopt a more explicitly con-
servative stance towards socialism than he had evidenced be-
fore his voyage.3° Royce confessed a fear of state socialism, 
even at the level of Deakin's practical art, because even there 
he saw the dangers of artificial design, officiousness, and po-
tential demagoguery. The fear and suspicion he confessed in 
his Australian articles serve as a healthy corrective for those 
who fancy that totalitarian collectivism follows from Royce's 
later views of the loyal self and the Beloved Community. 
Those who so opine seem to have lost sight of the indepen-
dence and self-reliance that are also integral to a Roycean 
loyal self. 
In the colonies' political organization, our Australian vis-
itor perceived two other dangers besides socialism. One was 
extravagant provincialism, in its various forms: political, eco-
nomic, and cultural. Through the decades Royce was to wield 
his pen in fighting that beast. The other danger was an exces-
sive activity and haste in forming political organizations. 
About the latter, he left only a few brief clues. But he poured 
out more than two thousand words to describe how "provin-
cialism, ... the great curse of the Australasian," takes var-
ious forms and grows. The remedies he suggested against it, 
however, seem more important: adopt wider ideals and take 
part in the ideals and the work of all peoples. This suggestion 
came in a long but telling quotation drafted more than fifty 
years before the United Nations' Declaration of Human 
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Rights. "The remedy for provincialism is of course always 
such a breadth of ideals and purposes as enables one, not to 
destroy, but to transcend, one's naturally narrow interests. 
Great nations are never without their provincial tempera-
ment, but they have become great by more or less completely 
humanizing their temperament, by sharing the ideals and 
the work of humanity without forgetting their private con-
cerns. "3 1 This quotation instances the balance and com-
plexity of Royce's thought. Yet, with its vague phrases, like 
"humanizing" and "sharing the ideals and the work of hu-
manity," Royce's statement, however tantalizingly accurate, 
merely touches on themes that call for more articulate anal-
ysis. By often revisiting these themes in the remaining twen-
ty-eight years of his life, he would work to clarify the ulti-
mate sense of such phrases. 
Most people would not recognize the burden of multiple 
responsibilities as a remedy for hasty and excessive political 
organization, the third danger which Royce foresaw for colo-
nial government. Royce felt that a person with many duties 
would be more cautious about any impetuous move that 
would endanger several other responsibilities. At least 
against "Australia's other great evil, . . . overactivity and 
hasty organization in the political sphere," Royce recom-
mended "such a wealth of political duties as forces a 
community to move deliberately and cautiously. "32 Very fre-
quently a policy recommendation that looks bright enough 
in itself takes on a different hue when viewed through the 
complicated network of one's basic survival procedures al-
ready under way. 
At the time of Royce's survey, there was a chief political 
duty that required cautious and deliberate movement by 
each colony. For, as Royce put it, "the chief hope of 
Australia must lie in the federation of her now disunited 
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communities." 33 What was the present state of their 
federation question? Royce sketched how far the colonies' 
physical conditions and consciousness of this "cause" had 
evolved. Alongside hopeful happenings, he noticed South 
Australia's timidity towards federation and New South 
Wales's ridicule of it. Clearly the chief hope involved 
commercial as well as political negotiations. Royce also 
indicated two pseudocauses that hindered the colonists' 
pursuit of federation. First was the aforementioned ex-
travagant provincialism in any of its forms. Also afloat, at the 
other extreme of opinion, was the romantic dream of form-
ing one transcontinental "larger England" which was 
supposed to intensify the bonds of the present members of 
the British Empire by welding them all into one nation. 
Having already criticized extravagant provincialism, Royce 
now tested the viability of this greater imperial cause. With 
six pages of carefully reasoned arguments he seriously ques-
tioned its possibility. 
As Royce discerned it, not imperial federation but colo-
nial federation was the direction of the future. "The British 
Empire is already big with child, this child being the coming 
Australian nation. . . . Let the child be born, not premature-
ly, but in due time. "34 Australia's healthy development re-
quired such a separation of child from mother. The present 
need of the imperial connection for military and financial 
reasons was "great, but ... not boundless." In time, with 
Australia's further growth, it would be much less needed. 
Nor were reasons of affection moving in that direction, 
either. Royce pointed out four signs of a "growing spirit of 
independence in the colonies" -countersigns to the "mere 
sentiment of imperial loyalty." 
First of all, the crown's recent attempt to appoint a gover-
nor of Queensland had caused much trouble because the 
crown had not consulted in advance with Queensland 
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whether the proposed candidate was acceptable. Second, as a 
general rule now, the colonies were unwilling to submit to 
the "Downing Street" influence on home and foreign pol-
icies. Furthermore, beneath the colonists' passionate anti-
Chinese agitation in May and June 1888, one pervasive 
consensus was felt: If Australian interests conflicted with im-
perial policy, then, "the imperial policy must simply give 
way." And finally, the young Australian party, that vigor-
ously growing seed of Australia's future, favored eventual in-
dependence of an Australian nation. 
Interestingly, the way in which Royce argued this 
political question was not by deduction from moral prin-
ciples, but rather by induction towards "the actual tendency 
of social evolution in Australia." The basis offered for so 
arguing sounds about as naturalistic as can be imagined in an 
"idealist" like Royce: "Social duties never run utterly 
counter to social facts, but depend upon a sound and just use 
of the facts. "35 Here we find yet another instance of Royce's 
empiricism. 
Royce next peered beyond the eventual federation of the 
colonies. He broadened his scope to include Australia, New 
Zealand, Oceania, and the East Indies, along with China, 
India, and Russia. Amid such a startlingly new context and 
its much mistier possibilities, he inquired what roles these 
embryonic nations of Australasia would play in world civili-
zation. Royce knew the importance of discerning at long 
range the leading political roles that New Zealand and Aus-
tralia would be called upon to play in Australasia. He was 
sensitive to the powerful positions of Australasia's neighbors, 
China, India, and Russia-even if he did not mention Japan 
explicitly.36 In his eyes, the threatened immigration of Chi-
nese into Australia-a threat that occasioned the 1888 
disturbance in Sydney-was simply symptomatic of a rela-
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tionship that had to be worked out. He concluded that this 
"Chinese Question" would largely occasion the separation of 
Australia from the British Empire. Though this prediction 
proved erroneous, his argument leading to it seems signifi-
cant for current political philosophy. 
In brief, Royce argued that he had found in basic racial 
homogeneity a limiting condition for the political life of a 
great nation. Attempts to build a nation out of different 
races incurred "endless possible complications" and "inevita-
ble disagreements." If f<;>rce was applied to the racial minor-
ity and the attendant evils arose, there was, at the very least, 
the risk of fracturing the basic national consensus. Or there 
was the risk of losing plurality-consensus, the basis for that 
political unity which a great nation requires. I leave to the 
reader to discern whether in the following passage Royce dis-
played a hard-nosed realism, or an anglophile sense of supe-
riority, or a waspish white racism, or something else. Turning 
to our American attempt to build a great nation with a black 
minority, he made a dire prediction that nearly a century of 
history has not falsified: "[Here is] something far more sig-
nificant than a hatred of cheap labor, or even a contempt for 
an alien race. We in this country have suffered and will yet 
suffer far too deeply from the presence in our midst of a few 
million very docile and well-meaning negroes to be in a posi-
tion to doubt the dangers of founding a great nation, in a 
new country, upon the basis of race heterogeneity." For 
Royce there is great danger even in mixing different strains of 
the very same race: "Even the mixture of the European stocks 
themselves, although it is inevitable, involves as here in 
America, evils enough on the way." But to go further and 
mix the races themselves would certainly spell greater evils. 
Accordingly, when founding their new nation, the Aus-
tralians would be "hanging the millstone round their own 
necks" if they granted the Chinese such free access as would 
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allow them to grow within fifty years to a quarter of Austra-
lia's population. Royce conceded that to forestall such an 
influx of Chinese the Australians would have to assume to-
wards China "an attitude that must at best be frequently 
unfriendly," but one that in the end would be "the highest 
political wisdom." The price of becoming a great nation was 
politically to limit one's welcomes and maintain control of 
one's admissions. "We did not create the Orientals," wrote 
Royce, " ... but we are to blame if, knowing the inevitable 
disagreements that must result, we invite them to help us 
form a great nation in our own territory." Such realistic lim-
its cause one to doubt a primarily romantic reading of 
Royce's later philosophy of the Beloved Community. 
In the Roycean thesis of 1888, "Race homogeneity is the 
basis of healthy national life," it is unfortunately implied 
that healthy national life, or a great nation, only occurs with 
white race homogeneity-and preferably Anglo-Saxon race 
homogeneity. Royce's pronounced bias that white Anglo-
Saxon culture was, overall, ultimately superior to all other 
cultures was widespread in his era. Like many of his contem-
poraries, Royce was caught in a monocultural pattern and 
feared the loss of Anglo-Saxon cultural dominance in the im-
migrant tide of Latins, Semites, and SlavsY 
Having found in one popular writing of Royce's early pe-
riod a preference for white dominance, we need to view it in 
the context of his long-term, personal concern to promote in-
terracial justice and to reduce racial prejudice. For instance, 
later on he often delivered a lecture examining racial antip-
athies and illusions. In 1913 he developed his doctrine that 
the heart of genuine loyalty must pulse with the will to do 
atoning deeds that reconcile alienated human beings. 38 
Moreover, even while dissenting from Royce's 1888 prefer-
ence for white dominance, one can concede him a certain 
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perspicacity ,39 For Royce saw acutely that race operates at a 
level far deeper than skin pigmentation and creates profound 
differences. This led him to face the polar tension between 
one's loyalties to all mankind and to his own race. Practically 
Royce solved it by favoring that particular loyalty which pos-
sessed the better organizations for fulfilling specific duties. 
Comparing a person's dual responsibility to mankind and to 
his country (preferably homogeneous in race), Royce stated: 
". . . however loyal we try to be to humanity, we cannot for-
get that such loyalty must for many centuries to come be 
expressed only in concrete, and therefore in somewhat exclu-
sive, national organizations." 40 Admittedly, multinational 
corporations, mass media, and the United Nations supply us 
with a viewpoint very different from Royce's. Yet even in 
1888, he advocated loyal dedication to further the moral in-
sight in any man and to support responsible development in 
education everywhere. Hence, in the text above, his require-
ment of "many centuries" seems a pretension, and his exclu-
sive "only" surprises many by its lack of qualification. 
Royce returned to this polar tension between one's coun-
try and mankind in his 1891 article: "Human brotherhood is 
a noble thing; but political unity is a matter of stern justice as 
well as of home-seeking devotion. You best honor both the 
justice and the devotion when you confine their work within 
easily intelligible boundaries. "41 By opposing what is noble 
and what is stern justice, Royce invited his reader to think 
that strict justice operates only in a political unity with its 
positive law obligations, and not between men of different 
countries simply qua men. By preferring that one confine 
himself within easily intelligible boundaries, such as civil law 
responsibilities, Royce downplayed the more basic values and 
duties of human beings qua human. Such values and correla-
tive duties are too vital to be boxed within easily intelligible 
boundaries; rather, they are exempt from boundaries of na-
Social and Political Philosophy I 75 
cion and race, because deeper than either. Royce seems here 
to have given undue emphasis to specifiable values and in 
this way to have blocked himself from an inclusive pursuit of 
all the basic human values wherever man is found and to 
whatever race he belongs. These fundamental values would 
certainly include every individual human life, every promo-
tion of moral insight, every fostering of that respect and con-
cern which bond people humanly. 
We extend our evaluation beyond Royce's view of the 
tension between mankind and its nations (and races) to 
Royce's 1888 social and political thought generally. What 
were its strengths and shortcomings? We begin with some 
strengths. Royce operated with a clear distinction between 
community and society, even if he did not use those terms as 
technically as Tonnies was later to use Gemeinschaft and 
Gesellschaft. For Royce a people was more basic and signif-
icant than a state. So, rather than employing government, he 
was inclined to rely mainly on nonpolitical forces such as 
race, commerce, culture, and religion to secure and promote 
a people's healthy unity. His recognition that greater power 
for building world community lies in nonpolitical fields 
would increasingly come into play as Royce entered his final 
years. 42 Our experience of the organizations auxiliary to the 
United Nations would confirm this view. 
Secondly, Royce showed how the variable psychic stances 
of citizens and officials, ranging from apathy to close involve-
ment, determine the quality of political life in a state. His 
concern to uncover the five conditions for the shared con-
sciousness distinctive of a genuine community became ex-
plicit only in his 1913 classic, The Problem of Christianity. 43 
Yet already in his 1888-1891 writings, he tried to lay bare the 
conscious conditions-attitudes, expectations, felt risks, and 
so forth-that made the political consciousness of Australians 
different from that of Americans. Moving to social life gener-
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ally-in its nonpolitical as well as political forms-Royce in-
vestigated how even apparently trivial details significantly al-
ter a group's social consciousness. He also studied how the 
Australians' more widespread commitment to engage in 
amateur sports and to live outdoors differentiated them from 
Americans. He asked the basic question, How did the Aus-
tralians' greater respect for social order and organizations 
open up new possibilities of communal life which customary 
American rebelliousness and alienation forestalled? Here he 
seems to have pioneered in advance of George Herbert Mead, 
who was Royce's pupil in the fall of 1887, and also in advance 
of James Baldwin, who was a coresearcher with Royce in so-
cial psychology during the nineties. 
Thirdly, Royce's complex mind was convinced that keep-
ing in realistic touch with social consciousness requires a prac-
tical balancing of many polarities. For him, social life 
consisted in interactions that needed a balanced "give and 
take" between citizens and officials, among the several col-
onies, and between each colony and the crown or Asiatic 
power. Although we just expressed our reservations about 
one dimension of Royce's polarities-in-balance, nevertheless, 
Royce's cultivated sensitivity to the overall need of balancing 
reciprocal relations deserves commendation. In his Australian 
articles, we found him concerned to harmonize various polar-
ities-of the self and mankind, of a small state and a political 
I 'federation of mankind,'' of 1 1 home-seeking devotion'' and 
universality of intent, of self-reliance and loyalty. For exam-
ple, he did not allow the grand ideal of universal community 
to lift his feet off the ground, but pragmatically required 
some businesslike art of patiently working here and now 
through extant practicable forms towards a somewhat better 
realization of that ideal in the near future. In his basic intel-
lectual life-style, Royce was convinced that any approach to 
wisdom required, beyond all the needed analyses, a synthetic 
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effort of balanced opposites, done with as much rigor and 
criticality as one could muster. This gives us a glimpse into 
Royce's complex mind. 
A man's shortcomings are often the unconscious deposits 
of his own limited cultural environment. Such were Royce's 
1888 shortcomings. Contrasted against his mental depth and 
breadth in 1916, they reveal what a surprising purification 
was at work in this mind which was so early dedicated to a 
critical quest for more truth. 
Here we merely touch upon a Westerner's prejudice and 
his notion of a human right. In his Australian writings, Royce 
exhibited a commonly held Western prejudice that, because 
of destiny or historical necessity, "Europe will of course in 
time master by far the larger part of both Asia and Africa." 44 
To say that Western technology, science, and urbanization 
tend to so dominate is hardly the same as to declare that 
Western life-styles, ideas, political power, and economics 
will surely so dominate. Much less is it to say that Western 
colonization and empire building will "of course" master 
Asia and Africa, as Royce opined. 
His sense of white superiority led him to another unfortu-
nate expression: "Australia, when she grows a great nation, is 
to be the first civilized power of the Pacific, and as such must 
always steadily strive to remain the influence of Chi-
na· . . . since Australia must be distinctly . . . opposed to 
the Chinese Empire in the Pacific. "45 Even if we recall that 
Royce may here have viewed China andJapan in Asia rather 
than in the Pacific, we still can hardly save this statement. For 
he does not refer to them as venerable civilizations. Nor does 
he suggest that the Australians might enrich their culture by 
studying Oriental ideas-at least as a counterbalance to An-
glo-American ideas. Rather, his articles create the impression 
that to be Europeanized is to be civilized, but to be Oriental 
is to be barbarian. Furthermore, by emphasizing the need to 
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restrain the "Chinese Empire in the Pacific," he assumed 
that the much more foreign British Empire was far more 
clearly entitled to rule in the Pacific with ever growing influ-
ence. 
We would not ordinarily expect such an 1888 anglophile 
to become a pioneer in initiating dialogue between philos-
ophies of the East and West. But fortunately, Royce so devel-
oped. Nor would we look for the man who penned such 
myopic lines to become "ecumenical" among world reli-
gions. Yet Royce grew sufficiently in mental stature to draft 
an instructive comparison ofBuddhism and Christianity, and 
a masterpiece in the philosophy of religion.46 Like most of us, 
Royce tended to identify his historical accidents with what is 
right. He was proud of having English blood, California in-
dependence, and a Harvard position. Like us, he subcon-
sciously felt that blood, birthplace, and career other than 
one's own were somehow not quite as good as one's own. 
Secondly, Royce showed a strength and a weakness in his 
notion of a human right. On the one hand, as he considered 
the traditional Anglo-American notion of a human right, he 
caught the exaggeration of its primarily defensive stance-a 
stance which our American overeagerness for rebellion and 
pure self-reliance stiffened. So, as a counterpoise, he reached 
out appreciatively to the Australian's greater respect for the 
social order. But, on the other hand, the Royce of 1888 was 
simply not yet aware of the inherent ontological dignity with-
in personal being. As a result, he was not yet able to root his 
notion of human right in the central grounding fact that the 
human person is as essentially social as he is essentially indi-
vidual and unique. 47 
In any overall evaluation, however, one needs to empha-
size that Royce's 1888 growth in metaphysics, ethics, and so-
cial and political philosophy far outdistanced the negative 
factors just mentioned. In October 1888 that acute observer 
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of men, William James, reported, "Royce is back from his 
voyage round the world, as fresh as a new-born babe, and as 
full of promise." 48 This perceptive psychologist spied in 
Royce's mind a new vitality, balance, and verve that enabled 
Royce characteristically to achieve that "freer simple touch 
with deepest relations" -to employ James's later description 






We have advanced an interpretation of Royce's metaphys-
ical, ethical, and sociopolitical thought in 1888. Can we test 
our interpretation? Does it fit in closely with what Royce re-
vealed of his philosophical positions shortly after he returned 
to America-specifically, with his expressions of the early 
nineties? Circumstances compel us to limit our test of basic 
correspondence to his metaphysics and ethics. For astonish-
ingly, after his Australian writings Royce did not offer any 
similarly clear and extensive expression of his sociopolitical 
vtews. 
By·which criteria, then, shall we measure his 1888 meta-
physics and ethics against those of the early nineties? We se-
lect Royce's "insight through Schroeder" of about 1891 and 
ask whether it is continuous with his concern with the "self' 
which deepened in Australia. We also choose his first major 
philosophical writings after his return: the popular synthesis 
of his metaphysics in his 1892 Spirit of Modern Philosophy, 
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and his more technical 1892 article, "The Implications of 
Self-Consciousness." 1 
After his return from the South Seas and after 1890, but 
many years before his 1899 Gifford Lectures, Royce experi-
enced a moderate philosophical breakthrough. For he re-
ported being "much struck by the remarkable proof, in the 
first volume [1890] of [Ernst] Schroeder's Algebra der 
Logik. "2 The proof showed that if one provisionally regards 
as the "whole of the universe" any simply defined universe of 
classes of objects, and if one simply reflects on these classes 
from a new viewpoint, then contradictions arise since the new 
secondary realm lies outside the "whole of the universe." 
Following this clue, Royce penetrated to the metaphysical 
significance of Schroeder's proof; namely, that no one can 
come to any ultimate human definition of the genuine whole 
of the universe unless he comes round in the end to employ-
ing an endless process of self-reflection. Royce's own words 
surpass any attempt at paraphrase: "The true totality of Be-
ing can therefore only be defined by an endless process, or is 
an endless reflective system. This proof of Schroeder's first 
brought home to me the fact that the necessity for defining 
reality in self-reflecting or endless terms is not dependent 
upon any one metaphysical interpretation of the world, 
whether realistic or idealistic, but is the consequence of a 
purely abstract account of the formal Logic of the concept of 
Reality in any of its forms. "3 The concept of Reality, however 
interpreted, necessarily requires that an endless self. reflective 
process be the basic structure of any true definition of Reality 
as a whole. Central here is a reflection, by a self, of a self. 
Such self-reflection inevitably includes an endless series of 
other finite selves within an actually Infinite Self. By 1899, 
Royce came to regard "this result as of the greatest weight for 
any metaphysical enterprise." For he had discovered that 
"this truth is common property for all, whether realists or 
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idealists, whether sceptics or dogmatists." Hence, around 
1891 Royce had, in one key sense, already delved "beyond 
idealism and realism." For he had penetrated to a self-rein-
stating, and thus undeniable, structure present in any mean-
ing of Reality as a whole, whether conceived by dogmatist or 
sceptic, realist or idealist. Consequently, Royce's insight 
through Schroeder would be highly significant for the mid-
dle and final stages of his philosophy. 
But is it clearly linked with his Australian sojourn? A sug-
gestion from Royce points to an affirmative answer. In 1899, 
as he reviewed his intellectual development since 1885, 
Royce reported that during this period he had not changed 
his definition of truth but shifted his interest to clarify "the 
special problems of human life and destiny."4 In 1885, he 
had "not emphasized prominently enough" will and experi-
ence in the Absolute. Hence, he continued, "the aspects of 
the Absolute Life which they [will and experience] denote 
have since [1885] become more central to my own interests." 
So Royce saw himself from 1885 to 1899 as making will and 
experience more central in his philosophy. He came to focus 
less exclusively on thought and more inclusively on life and 
purpose, deliberately synthesizing all life's meanings 
through interrelating individuals. Now what role did his in-
sights of 1888 and about 1891 play in this overall develop-
ment? 
As we saw, Royce's Australian experience of 1888 pro-
vided him with a deepened taste for life and for the loyal 
selfs free pursuit of ideals. On this cruise, he chose to keep 
putting first priority on true knowing rather than to follow 
Martineau and to place it on action. Yet maintaining this 
first priority did not keep Royce from roaming where the 
"fields of speculation are very wide and romantic" in search 
of life's many meanings, particularly "about Freedom and 
the Ideals."~ As we saw, his explosive "metaphysical specula-
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cion" had prompt repercussions in his ethical, social, and 
political thought. 
Accordingly, we may summarize Royce's overall phil-
osophic growth in 1888 as follows: It disposed Royce to focus 
on any dynamic of life and its meaning not only in such con-
texts as intellectual judgments and formal logic, but also and 
increasingly, in affective experiences, voluntary choices, and 
ego-alter relationships. This is the main conclusion of our in-
vestigation. To put it conservatively, then, Royce's deeper 
appreciation of concrete life and individuals, which he 
gained in Australia, was at least one operative ingredient 
which thereafter moved him, in his post-1888 metaphysics, 
to put more prominent emphasis on will and experience, on 
self and individual, amid his earlier categories of thought 
and Logos. On his return, then, with his consciousness 
heightened to attend to the self and to its free self-reflection, 
Royce would have been particularly sensitive around 1891 to 
catch the metaphysical import of Schroeder's remark. In this 
way his Australian experience seems a quite probable ground 
for Royce's insight through Schroeder. Moreover, the latter 
seems to be a coherent growth from his 1888 "metaphysical 
speculation." 
To submit our interpretation to another test, we turn to 
our second norm, a pair of Royce's 1892 writings. In The 
Spirit of Modern Philosophy, he popularly summarized his 
central position, and in his "Implications" article he brought 
this summary to more technical expression.6 "Implications" 
is an especially fitting norm for measuring the new game he 
had bagged in 1888. For following the journey it is his first 
technical attempt at rigorous expression of what he called his 
"ethical interpretation of reality." In it we find Royce carry-
ing to the academic public what he had promised to share 
with James. 7 
In general, both "Implications" and his popular sum-
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mary reveal his new sense of life, awakened in Australia. 
Both speak in Royce's new categories of self, person, reflec-
tive self-consciousness and, at least in "Implications," of the 
individual.8 Both are much concerned with the "old trouble 
about Continuity" and the "question about Freedom and 
the Ideals." In both writings, the Australian speculation 
which led Royce to distinguish between appreciation and de-
scription continues to insert that distinction and to produce 
its effects. 9 
Most significantly, however, the ethically just viewpoint 
emerges as an essential ingredient for constituting the self-re-
flective individual and his life. If the self lacks this viewpoint, 
there is an essential inadequacy in its grasp of the difference 
between a true meaning and an erroneous meaning. By 
1892, Royce's ethical norm has become "a Self that can re-
flect with justice and clearness. "10 Royce's evident growth in 
understanding loyalty during 1888 has now led logically and 
historically to his "ethical interpretation of reality" in his 
1892 writings. These latter specify both appreciation of and 
commitment to moral value as requisites for an essentially 
complete self-reflective process. 
If we further compare his Australian writings with his 
"Implications" article and with the popular summary, we 
find three additional points of basic similarity. First, Royce 
continued his theme of the immanence of the Infinite within 
the finite while rejecting either a dichotomy between or a 
confusion of the two. ln 1892 he wrote: "The finite does not 
vanish in him ["the Infinite ... Person"]; but he [the Infi-
nite] appears to us, although very imperfectly, through and 
by means of the finite. "11 Secondly, the questions of self-
identity and self-identifiability were as central in 1892 as they 
were in Royce's marginalia on Martineau aboard the Free-
man.12 Finally, at the close of "Implications," the philoso-
pher sketched the fully developed human self. In this sketch, 
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Royce uses his ethical viewpoint to unite the self s historically 
embodied actions (sociopolitical thought) with the selfs free 
willing to know personally the eternally True (metaphysics). 
In 1888 he had promised to share with James how "I have 
largely straightened out the big metaphysical tangle about 
continuity, freedom, and the world-formula, which, as you 
remember, I had aboard with me when I started. "13 Now he 
lets others share in his insight: "Every being who is rationally 
conscious of time, is, by that very fact, living in part out of 
the world of time. For what we know we transcend. To live in 
time by virtue of one's physical nature, but out of time by 
virtue of one's very consciousness of time itself, is to share in 
the eternal freedom, and to be a moral agent." 14 
In these ways, then, our two criteria confirm the interpre-
tation that Royce's intellectual development in 1888 was sig-






Ater his stay in Australia, Royce invested a month linger-
ing in New Zealand. He visited Auckland, Wellington, and 
the volcanic regions of the North Island. As previously noted, 
he found New Zealand's climate even more restorative than 
Australia's, and the Maoris were especially fascinating to 
him. Having completed what he called his "stay in para-
dise," Royce boarded the steamer Alameda, under the com-
mand of Master H. G. Morse. In three weeks he crossed the 
Pacific and on August 3 arrived within the Golden Gate. 1 
Enjoying excellent health as he stepped ashore in his na-
tive California, Royce quickly encountered some of the bit-
terness of life. Six weeks earlier his pioneer father, the senior 
Josiah Royce, worn out by years of toiling in a broken body, 
had died in Los Gatos. At that time Royce's mother, Sarah 
Eleanor, had been away in nearby SanJose nursing a gravely 
sick daughter, Ruth, who had not entirely recovered even by 
the time her distinguished brother arrived for a family visit in 
early August. At Los Gatos Royce found both his mother and 
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Ruth grief-stricken.2 Here Josiah felt his powerlessness. He 
had been away when his family needed him most. Now when 
present he was unable to provide much financial help during 
their need. So he deeply felt how the previous carelessness 
with his own health had hurt others too. To WilliamJames 
he confided: "Help from a good son who had been careful 
of his health and of his means wouldn't be a bad 
thing .... But I won't let myself be discouraged. The devil 
has had his own in my past. Perhaps he won't have so much 
in my future. We shall see." 3 During these weeks Royce 
probably accompanied Sarah Eleanor on a visit to Oak Hill 
cemetery in San Jose to visit his father's grave. If so, his fa-
ther's memory could hardly have failed to activate this young 
Josiah's "cult of the dead," and tp promote his rededication 
to philosophical pioneering. 
After some weeks with the bereaved, Royce returned to 
Harvard. As a fitting finale to his round-the-world trip, his 
train sped him past beautiful Mount Shasta and then 
through the majestic Canadian Rockies in all their multifac-
eted splendor. Yet the mountains were only an external sym-
bol of that interior multifaceted splendor we have here found 
in Royce-the correspondent, patient, naturelover, and ad-
venturer; the metaphysician, ethician, and student of society 
and politics. 
Happy to be back home again with his wife Katharine 
and their boys, Royce wrote to his mentor, Daniel Coit Gil-
man, "Ifeellike a bent bow, all ready to twang. " 4 
If the reader has seen that the present work is integrated 
around the idea of community which, in turn, has the idea of 
loyalty at its center, then he has recognized the order of this 
study. For the first part explored the affective and volitional 
side of Royce's personality. This background was needed to 
understand Royce the man who philosophizes. 
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The second part of the study, the principal investigation, 
entered directly into Royce's intellectual life and found his 
"metaphysical speculation" leading Royce through the 
World of Description into the World of Appreciation. Thus 
Royce won the ground for his doctrine of community. Then, 
through analysis ofRoyce's marginalia on Martineau, we con-
firmed this insight and manifested Royce's ultimate basis for 
community and loyalty in the all-knowing and all-apprecia-
tive One. However, by permitting moral evil, this Infinite 
Self seemed disloyal to his own universe; he apparently ex-
cluded even the possibility of such freedom and knowledge 
as are required by loyalty among human selves and by loyalty 
between them and God. Royce responded by clarifying the 
relation between moral values and this Infinite Self. The lat-
ter was recognized as the One who affirmatively initiates, ap-
preciates, restores, and governs community through moral 
values even though the ignorant and alienating finite selves, 
by their free decisions, sometimes stray from loyal realization 
of moral values. 
Next, when the study surveyed a dozen ingredients in 
Roycean loyalty, it was actually exploring the structures of 
genuine community consciousness. This study of loyalty be-
came concrete in Royce's description of the Australian back-
woodsman. 
Then for the first and last time in his life Royce provided 
an overall sketch of his social and political philosophy. This 
not only illustrated his embodiment of loyalty in concrete so-
cial and political conditions, but also called attention to 
some important restrictions needed when scholars interpret 
Royce's philosophy of loyalty. 
The third part of the study tested the validity of the find-
ings of this investigation. It asked whether Royce's subse-
quent writings manifested the presence of the new insights 
and doctrines reportedly gained during the 1888 experience, 
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and thus it checked these against evidences Royce offered in 
his writings completed between 1888 and 1892. 
From this outline the reader may now recognize more 
starkly Royce's 1888 philosophical method as it operates 
within the baselines of four major doctrines and typically ad-
vances through four procedural steps. 
Doctrinally, Royce chooses to believe that appreciative 
knowing brings a knower to a deeper level of reality than 
does descriptive knowing. In other words, Royce holds that 
intersubjective knowledge of the ego-alter type is more 
concrete, vital, and interpersonally significant that) is the in-
dispensable, powerful, but abstract way of knowing that 
characterizes the positive sciences. Secondly, the intersubjec-
tive community entered by appreciative knowing can be mor-
ally sound only if genuine loyalty animates its members and 
thus orients them to all mankind without exclusion. Thirdly, 
by recognizing that true appreciative knowing of being-in-
community is more fundamental than human feeling, free-
dom, and activity, Royce establishes his basic metaphysical 
order, in contrast to that of James Martineau whom he crit-
icizes. Finally, Royce grounds these three doctrinal options in 
the taproot of his thought, the idea of the all-knowing and 
all-loving Other as the ultimate explanation of reality. Thus 
he retains and enriches his fundamental "religious insight" 
of1883. 
A quartet of procedural choices also marks Royce's 1888 
method. His philosophy first penetrates through scientific 
knowledge (the World of Description) to that lived union 
with other beings with minds (the World of Appreciation). 
Vitally present to other selves, Royce next forms an apprecia-
tive understanding of them. Then moving into a procedure 
of contrast-comparison, Royce finds or invents a "third idea" 
which accurately accounts for the differences between the 
selves or their psychic products and which then reconciles and 
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mediates them into some vital union. Since this "third idea" 
occurs within Royce's fundamental commitment to promote 
the genuine life of loyalty everywhere (and thus to advance 
the universal community), it must in the end call for practi-
cal action of some constructive kind. 
These four procedural steps in Royce's method can be dis-
cerned in this study when Royce reflects philosophically. For 
example, when he, then thirty-two years old, sits on the deck 
of the Australia-bound Freeman and ponders the pages of 
James Martineau's A Study of Religion, he first gets in living 
touch with Martineau's mind through this book, then grad-
ually fashions his own interpretation of Martineau's mean-
ing, then finds or invents some "third idea" as a basis for 
agreeing or disagreeing with Martineau, and finally, under 
Martineau's overall influence, is led in practice to regard God 
less exclusively as the Knower and more as the Infinite Other 
Self whose appeal, experience, and will is present to Royce 
and all finite selves. Of course, such a "minor" revision of 
Royce's idea of God would have momentous practical conse-
quences. 
In conclusion, the reader is invited to test further the 
claims of the present study by measuring the consistency of 
the insights here highlighted with the Roycean writings of 
1892-1916 and with the investigations ofRoycean scholars. 
Notes 
Preface 
1. See the "Autobiographical Sketch," in Royce's The Hope of the 
Great Community (New York: Macmillan, 1916), pp. 122-23 (hereafter 
HGC). 
2. See Royce's "Last Lectures in Metaphysics, Notes of Lectures de-
livered by Josiah Royce in Phil. 9, Metaphysics, 1915-1916," lecture of Jan-
uary 11, 1916, p. 130, Richard C. Cabot Papers, Harvard Archives, Cam-
bridge, Mass. (quoted with permission; hereafter LLM). 
3. Date inferred from LLM, p. 135. Royce soon published this insight 
in chaps. 11 and 12 of his first major work, The Religious Aspect ofPhilos-
ophy (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1885), pp. 384-474 (hereafter RAP). 
4. In The World and the Individual, 2 vols. (New York: Macmillan, 
1899, 1901), 2:vii (hereafter WI), Royce publicly acknowledged having 
abandoned his former scepticism. 
5. LLM, lectureofJanuary 11,1916, p. 130. 
6. For a fuller description and supponing texts, see Frank Oppenheim, 
"Josiah Royce's Intellectual Development: An Hypothesis," Idealistic 
Studies6 (January 1976): 85-102. 
7. See LLM, p. 130, and WI, 2:vii. 
8. See LLM, pp. 134-35, for this and the next quotation. 
9. Ibid., p. 134. In this recollection of how he was led to his argument 
drawn from the possibility of error, Royce mentioned explicitly that one of 
the motives was the responsibility he felt to provide sound guidance to his 
students. 
10. See WI, 1:553, n. 1. 
11. For Royce's acknowledgments of Bradley's influence on him, see 
Royce's The Conception of God, 2d ed. (New York: Macmillan, 1897), p. 
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141, n. 1 (hereafter CG), and WI, 1:474. For some years after the 1893 
publication of Bradley's Appearance and Reality, Royce employed it as a 
textbook in his metaphysics course. 
12. Hints of this interaction between Royce and G. H. Howison appear 
in the 1897 edition of CG. For example, see Howison's essay (pp. 81-132), 
Royce's acknowledgment (pp. 136-37), and then the editorial notes that 
Howison appended to Royce's "Supplementary Essay," (pp. 181, 321, 
332, and 333). But for the even more revealing Royce-Howison correspon-
dence, see Royce to Howison, August 31, 1896, in The Letters of josiah 
Royce, ed. John Clendenning (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1970), pp. 347-48. 
13. Royce toG. H. Howison, August31, 1896,Letters, p. 347. 
14. Royce to James, June 21, 1901, Letters, p. 422. Recognizing the 
major impact these Piercean lectures had on his intellectual development, 
Royce wrote, not the expected "epoch-making," which is implied, but 
"epoch-marking," which provides an instance of Royce's retrospective in-
terpretation of an event's significance for his own thought growth. 
15. Royce to Mary Whiton Calkins, March 20, 1916, Letters, p. 645. 
SeealsoLLM,pp.130and 135. 
16. Royce to Mary Whiton Calkins, March 20, 1916, Letters, p. 645. 
17. See Royce's "First Berkeley Lecture, 1914," vol. 84, no. 3, pp. 5-
14, Royce Papers, Harvard Archives (quoted with permission). The central 
texts comprising this Roycean confession have been published in Oppen-
heim, "Hypothesis," pp. 85-86 and 99. 
18. See his The Philosophy of Loyalty (New York: Macmillan, 1908), 
pp. viii, 9, 56, and 197 (hereafterPL). 
19 .. See John Clendenning's "Introduction" in Letters, pp. 9-40, and 
Oppenheim's "Hypothesis." Moreover, even though Bruce Kuklick's full-
length study ,josiah Royce: An Intellectual Biography (Indianapolis, Ind.: 
Bobbs-Merrill, 1972), assigns exclusive primacy to logic in Royce's thought 
growth, this recent work contributes significantly to research on Royce. 
20. Each year two studies of Royce's biography and intellectual devel-
opment-by John Clendenning from the perspective of American studies 
and by Frank Oppenheim from the perspective of philosophical issues-
are moving nearer to publication. 
21. During this voyage Royce experienced an appeal-and-response dy-
namism operating between the egos and alter egos he encountered in var-
ious political and nonpolitical communities, as well as between the finite 
human ego and the Infinite Alter Ego mediated by the human communi-
ty. Such experience provided an empirical basis for his insight into loyalty. 
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22. Of the new life a recuperating Royce experienced after his long peri-
od of depression, he wrote, "now that passion has come again, and the 
good Lord seems to have somelife in his world ... " (Letters, p. 215). 
23. SeeHGC, p. 129. 
24. See RAP, pp. 384-474, esp. pp. 424-25. 
25. See Fugitive Essays by josiah Royce, ed. J. Loewen burg (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1920), p. 7 (hereafter FE). 
26. InJosiah Royce, The Problem of Christianity, 2 vols. (New York: 
Macmillan, 1913), lectures 11 and 12, 2: 109-221 (hereafter PC); cf. Op-
penheim, "Hypothesis," pp. 85-86 and 98-101). 
27. Royce to James, May 21, 1888, Letters, p. 216. 
1 
1. James to Santayana, April22, 1888, William James Papers, Hough-
ton Library, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass. 
2. The principal sources of the present study include: Royce's letters to 
Francis Ellingwood Abbot, Alfred Deakin, Daniel Coit Gilman, William 
James, Charles Rockwell Lanman, Horace Elisha Scudder-especially dur-
ing this period of spring and summer, 1888; Royce's 1888 marginalia in 
James Martineau's A Study of Religion, 2 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon, 
1888), as reserved in the Robbins Library, Harvard; Royce's two published 
articles describing his Australasian experiences: "Reflections after a Wan-
dering Life in Australasia," Atlantic Monthly 63 (1889): 675-86, and 813-
28; "Impressions of Australia," Scribners Magazine 9 (1891): 75-87; C. R. 
Lanman's diary for this period; the Los Gatos (Cal.) News, Aug. 23-24, 
1888; J. A. La Nauze, Alfred Deakin, 2 vols. (Cambridge, England: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1965); Walter Murdoch, Alfred Deakin: A Sketch 
(London: Constable & Co., 1923). Most of this correspondence is now 
available in The Letters of josiah Royce, ed. John Clendenning (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1970), esp. pp. 211-26, or in Ralph Barton 
Perry's The Thought and Character of William james, 2 vols. (Boston: Lit-
tle, Brown, & Co., 1935), vol. 1 (hereafter TCW]), or in the works of La 
Nauze and Murdoch. 
3. See Oppenheim, "Hypothesis," pp. 89,95-99. 
4. See Royce to James, May 21, 1888, Letters, p. 216. 
5. Ibid.; "Universal Thought" refers to the terminus of Royce's theis-
tic argument in RAP, chap. 11, esp. pp. 423-35. 
6. JamestoRoyce,August24, 1888, TCW], 1:802. 
7. Letters,p.211. 
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8. Milton R. Konvitz, review of The Basic Writings of josiah Royce, 
ed. John]. McDermott (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969), in 
Saturday Review, Jan. 24,1970, p. 29. 
9. Josiah Royce, The Spirit of Modern Philosophy (Boston: Houghton 
Mifflin, 1892), pp. 342-44 (hereafter SMP). Royce and William James 
concurred that in general one's temperament determines one's philos-
ophy. But unlike James, Royce specified that one's "essential temper-
ament'' is what truly determines one's philosophy and that only by a 
careful study of the histoty of philosophy can one learn which ideals have 
permanent human value and thus discover the difference between one's 
accidental and essential temperament. 
10. Royce referred at least twice to the manuscript he mailed to his wife 
from Melbourne at no small expense; see Letters, pp. 213 and 215. This 
stoty of his outbound voyage, most likely in the form of a journal, is not 
extant in Roycean deposits known to the present writer. If found, it would 
critically control much of the present study. 
11. Some may wish a closer look at these objections and the evidence 
behind the terse replies in the text. A first objection: was not Royce's 1888 
round-the-world voyage a pleasantly restful cruise designed mainly to cure 
an "over-tasked man" (Letters, p. 214) and thus a vety unlikely situation 
for any significant intellectual growth? The objection overlooks the re-
corded phenomenon that great minds fairly often find insights dawning 
when they move towards, or live within, the leisure that follows intense 
toil and fruitless search for an answer. (This theme recurs in Rollo May's 
The Courage to Create [New York: W. W. Norton, 1975] and is under-
scored by B. F.]. Lonergan in his Insight [New York: Philosophical Li-
braty, 1957], chap. 1.) One recalls Archimedes' "Eureka!" while here-
laxed in the baths of Syracuse, after his long unsuccessful search to find a 
way to test the purity of the gold in the king' s crown. We know Royce had 
long struggled with a "big metaphysical tangle" before sailing. What 
more likely occasion for an intellectual breakthrough than when, recuper-
ated and relaxed, he rested "amid the trade-winds, and under the softly 
flapping canvas" (Letters, p. 217)? 
A second objection: when writing to William James, did not Royce 
confess, "In the deepest of my nothingness I read ... Martineau 
... with an impartial insight into the essential nothingness of ... 
divine laws" (Letters, p. 215)? Are not his marginalia on Martineau, then, 
at least suspect since they seem to be the product of deep unbalanced 
depression? Critically, can one rely on them, even in a subordinate way? 
In reply, one might first notice two things that Royce did not say in the 
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excerpt just quoted. He did not say that the only time he read Martineau 
was when he was "in the deepest of my nothingness," nor does Royce 
make any mention of drafting marginalia in these times. Rather, his initial 
dullness very likely prevented his writing numerous notes then. Marginalia 
usually require revived spirits. 
In positive and more significant response to this objection, however, it 
should be said that the intrinsic qualiry of Royce's marginalia attests to a 
very perceptive mind. Ralph Barton Perry was arrested so much by one of 
these marginal notes that he selected it as singularly representative of 
Royce's central position. (See below, n. 29 in chap. 3.) Finally, apropos of 
a subordinate use of his marginalia on Martineau, Royce himself provides 
some guidance. His South Sea reading of Martineau' sA Study ofReligion 
so deeply influenced him that, although he had criticized and transcended 
its viewpoint already in 1888 (Letters, p. 216), he revealed what it meant to 
him twenty-eight years later. For in 1916, when selecting only six refer-
ences for his "Monotheism" article in Hastings's Encyclopaedia, Royce in-
cluded Martineau's A Study of Religion, along with Kant and Hegel. In 
sum, then, available signs suggest that a largely recuperated Royce, duly 
impressed by Martineau, drafted the marginalia. Accordingly, if used crit-
ically and subordinately, the latter may enter into the present study. 
2 
1. Royce's first trio of books from his Harvard period were RAP 
(1885), California from the Conquest in 1846 to the Second Vigilance 
Committee in San Francisco: A Study of American Character (1886), and 
The Feud of Oakfield Creek: A Novel of California Life (1887). Each was 
published by Houghton Mifflin of Boston. 
2. Royce to Daniel Coit Gilman, February 9, 1888, Gilman Papers, 
Johns Hopkins University Archives; see Letters, p. 211. 
3. Clues emerge from the C. R. Lanman diaries of 1888 under dates of 
January 11, February 28,June4, and August4, Harvard Archives. 
4. See Royce to Francis Ellingwood Abbot, February 9, 1888, Letters, 
p. 212; and see Abbot to Royce, February 12, 1888, F. E. Abbot Papers, 
Harvard Archives. Abbot's other letters of this period reveal a temper-
ament markedly different from Royce's. 
5. Martineau inscribed opposite the title page of vol. 1: "Professor Jo-
siah Royce with the Author's Respects." See Royce's copy of this 1888 edi-
tion reserved in Robbins Library, Harvard. 
6. See Royce to James, May 21, 1888, and August 10, 1888, Letters, 
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pp. 217 and 219. The kind letters of introductionfrom Horace E. Scudder 
aimed to facilitate Royce's meeting with persons in the Sandwich Islands; 
see Letters, p. 214. Royce's change of travel plans rendered them unneces-
sary. 
7. Royce to C. R. Lanman, May 21, 1888,Letters, p. 213. 
8. Royce to H. E. Scudder, May 21, 1888, Letters, p. 214. 
9. Royce to James, May 21, 1888, Letters, p. 215. The mention of 
"Sonnen und Milchstrassen," (suns and milky ways), interestingly alludes 
to the voluntaristic Schopenhauer's conclusion in The World as Wtll and 
Presentation. Here Royce does not employ Hegelian terms like Logos or 
Idea, even though he does describe his own way of putting "the mysteries 
of absolute idealism." Rather than withdrawing from physical reality, as 
he found most mystics doing, Royce increasingly emphasized during the 
next twenty-five years how important it is to stand in loyal affirmation of 
these "suns and milky ways" and to cooperate with them (see PC, 2 :308). 
10. Royce to H. E. Scudder, May 21, 1888, Letters, p. 214. 
11. See Letters, p. 210, for example. Royce is grateful "for a few charm-
ing days" with the Dorrs whose hospitality offered Royce and his wife the 
mountains and water they loved. · 
12. See Letters, pp. 214-17; vis medicatrix naturae (nature's healing 
force) was the name Royce explicitly gave this tendency. when six years later 
he published "The Case of John Bunyan," republished in his Studies of 
Good and Evil (New York: Appleton and Co., 1898), p. 68 (hereafter 
SGE). 
13. Royce to C. R. Lanman, May 21, 1888, Letters, p. 213; Royce to 
James, May 21, 1888, Letters, p. 216. 
14. See Letters, pp. 213-14 and217. 
15. Within a year of his return to Harvard, Royce published his "Re-
flections after a Wandering Life in Australasia," in the May and June 
numbers of the Atlantic Monthly 63 (1889):675-86, and 813-28. A year 
and a half later he published his "Impressions of Australia," in Scnbners 
Magazine 9 (1891):76-87. Royce's account of his hike in the Blue Moun-
tains occurs in "Impressions," pp. 78-83. 
16. "Impressions," p. 79. 
17. Ibid., p. 83. After using several pages to describe his encounter with 
nat4re in this subjectivity-centered style, for a few lines Royce suddenly 
shifted into the style of a disciplined behaviorist and recorded only his 
measurable bodily behavior in response to Wentworth scenety: the pant-
ing, heart-leap, and visceral reactions entirely stripped of the felt emotions 
and moods recorded in his more usual style. 
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18. Ibid. 
19. SMP, pp. 342-44,174-76. 
20. He had already described our affective favoritism for "what is near 
and clear" to us, and our absurd prejudice toward unfamiliar faces and 
places, in "Reflections," p. 676. A few years after his Australian trip, 
Royce significantly wove into the historical account of his SMP (1892) 
chapters entitled "The Rediscovery of the Inner Life" and "The Romantic 
School in Philosophy." In SMP' s latter and constructive part, he started by 
reminding readers that romantic surprises fill the empirical sciences, but 
fill philosophy "far more so" (SMP, p. 311). Here he also made explicit his 
key distinction between the World of Appreciation and the World of De-
scription, between the self's privately felt affective knowledge and its 
shareable abstract objective knowledge (SMP, pp. 391-96). 
21. In "Reflections," "Impressions," and Letters, pp. 213-19 and225. 
22. For this close-up of Royce's interaction with nature, see Letters, p. 
217. 
23. E.g.,ibid.,orTCWJ, 1:801-2. 
24. LLM,lecture ofMay 27, 1916, p. 462. 
25. SMP, pp. 391-96. 
26. James to Royce, August 24, 1888, TCWJ, 1 :802; "your empin'sches 
Bewusstsein" is "your consciousness as touched by experience" (rather 
than as affected by reflection and reasoning). 
27. Royce, "Self-Consciousness, Social Consciousness, and Nature," 
SGE, pp. 199 and 204-5. Royce first published the article in Philosophical 
Review4 (1895):465-85 and 577-602. 
28. Nature becomes inert and manipulable only when we secondarily 
transfigure it into the World of Description, so that we can dominate and 
develop it for our ends. 
29. Royce made this commitment on February 12, 1879, during his 
''Meditation before the [Golden] Gate.'' It is published in FE, p. 7. 
30. See Letters, pp. 213 and 217. 
31. Letters, p. 214. 
32. The mutual discovery of these most agreeable companions echoes in 
Deakin's "Rough Diary, 1888," which first indicates them together, 
"Tues 5 June. Train with Royce to Sydney," then records long talks and 
drive to Wentworth Falls, and closes "Wed. 13 June. Goodbye Royce." 
Deakin Papers, National Library of Australia, Canberra; courtesy of Profes-
sor John La Nauze. 
33. See "Impressions," p. 78. 
34. RoycetoDeakin,June21,1888,Letlers, p. 218. 
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35. Sir Saul Samuel, 1820-1900, was prominent in political life in New 
South Wales from the 1850s, serving as the Agent General of this colony at 
London from 1880 to 1897. His 1888 meeting with Royce seems to have 
occurred during Samuel's return to London after a visit to New South 
Wales. 
36. PC, 2:45-48. Besides the Maoris' willingness to take risks to preserve 
their tribal life and history, the voluntarism of the Australian pioneers bat-
tling the desert caught Royce's attention; see "Reflections," pp. 677 and 
680. 
3 7. More than two decades after his 1888 voyage, Royce revealed his 
continuing interest in Australasian primitives, especially in the Maoris of 
New Zealand. See his 1913 PC, 2:45-49, 69, and his article, "Primitive 
Ways of Thinking, with Special Reference to Negation and Classification," 
Open Court 27 (1913): 577-98. (For Royce's references to his own readings 
in South Sea culture and history, see esp. pp. 587-88, 592-95, and 597 .) 
38. RoycetoDeakin,June21, 1888,Letters, p. 218. 
39. Royce to James, August 10, 1888, Letters, p. 219, the source of the 
present paragraph. 
3 
1. Royce to C. R. Lanman, May 21, Letters, p. 213. 
2. Some minor clues exist, such as the one Royce dropped on August 
10, 1888, when he wrote James, "I have many things to tell you about phi-
losophy." Thus Royce's May 21 eagerness to share his "new specimen" 
with James seems to have continued. If so, his insight was developing into 
"many things." Fittingly enough, since one expects a philosophical in-
sight, if genuine, to deepen and develop. 
3. See box E, autograph notebook no. 3, 1884 and 1888, Royce Pa-
pers, Harvard Archives. 
4. Royce never published this work as sketched in 1888. After his four-
page note on "Individuals," drafted on the following day (April6), Royce 
made no entry in this philosophical journal until October 31, 1888, when 
back at Cambridge. So the only extant record of his development during 
the next forry-four days of his voyage (from April 6 to May 21 when he 
wrote off Melbourne) seems to be Royce's marginalia on A Study of Reli-
gion. 
5. See box E, autograph notebook no. 3, under dates of October 3 
and December 25, 1888, andJuly 3 and 14, 1889, Royce Papers. All thes 
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recast outlines reflect Royce's Religious Aspect ofPhzlosophy and foreshad-
ow part 2 of his Spirito f Modern Philosophy. 
6. Ibid., "The World as Paradox and as Ideal," pp. 11-12 (Royce's 
emphasis). 
7. On May 21, 1888, Royce twice toldJames he read Martineau while 
aboard and made it clear that by that date he had completed reading, if 
not all, at least half of Martineau (Letters, pp. 215-16). Accordingly, what 
date is to be assigned to Royce's marginal jottings in A Study ofReligion? 
Several signs govern my reply. Ordinarily marginalia are made during 
one's reading of the volume thus annotated. Further, at no other time in 
his life have I found Royce expressing an in-depth personal response to 
Martineau'sA Study a/Religion. But here on May 21, 1888, he readily ob-
serves to] ames that "dear good Martineau runs the same old treadmill for 
half his book." Thirdly, in the Clarendon Press advertisements at the close 
of Royce's own second volume of Martineau's A Study of Religion, Royce 
inserted navigational jottings. Thus, for example, not only on p. 37 did he 
subtract "53.18" from "57 .32" to get "4.14" of progress on his voyage, 
but on p. 39 of these advertisements, his jottings reveal Royce trying to 
read semaphore signals between his ship and passing vessels. He noted that 
the signals were this time coming not from "We," but from a sending 
ship, thus: "He (2) R S Q = Thanks Poonah [India], May 6." This dates 
at least some of Royce's writings in his second volume of Martineau. More-
over, a month earlier, when Royce sketched a sixteen-page outline of "The 
World as Paradox and as Ideal" under the heading "Barque Freeman, 
April 5, '88" (seen. 3 above), he never once mentioned Martineau even 
though he referred to Kant, Spencer, Wundt, and Spinoza in his sketch. 
This omission would be odd and unlike Royce if by that date he had al-
ready encountered the latter three-fourths of Martineau's work with his 
mind alert enough to pencil critical notations in the margins. (Royce's con-
fession of reading Martineau "in the deepest of my nothingness" may well 
refer to an attempt during March to leaf languidly through that first quar-
ter of the work which he left practically unannotated.) Finally, the pen-
manship of Royce's marginalia on Martineau closely parallels that of his 
May 21 letter to James. It is not as smooth and flowing as his usual healthy 
hand, such as is found in his August 10, 1888,letter to James. Rather, the 
style is just a bit abrupt and stiff-neither shaky with sickness nor fully 
smooth and easy. Hence, the evidence suggests that the date of Royce's 
marginalia on Martineau's A Study of Religion not only coincides with the 
1888 voyage but very probably is about early May 1888. 
8. Letters, pp. 215-16. 
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9. In his metaphysics lecture of January 11, 1916, Royce pointed to 
January 11-12, 1883, as the birthday of the religious insight that seeded 
RAP; see LLM, p. 135. 
10. See WI, 1: xv-xvi, and Clendenning's note 114 in Letters, p. 215. 
11. Royce had had his "trouble with Continuity" for at least eight 
years. In 1880 at Berkeley, he felt Shadworth Hodgson's discussion of suc-
cession was "full of difficulties and not satisfactory." Then focusing on 
how we cut past and future from the present, he judged, "The question is 
who shall now weave up the rope again?" Significantly for his 1892 distinc-
tion between "appreciation" and ~description," even in 1880 he found 
that his present act of thinking could not be described, but only experi-
enced. For him, the act of thinking which declares some content present 
has as its purpose to give significance to, or express the significance of, the 
present moment. But the thinking act cannot do this unless it constructive-
ly postulates an ideal past and future so that in this way an object as pres-
ent becomes meaningful. In his June 7, 1880, letter to William James, 
Royce's word and his very long, careful account of his reflection reveals 
how much, even then, his heart was involved in the "old uouble with Con-
tinuity" (Letters, pp. 79-83). 
12. I here parallel the more general hermeneutic position of John Clen-
denning(Letters, p. 216,'n. 115). 
13. Martineau, A Study ofReligion, 1 :21)-30 (hereafter SR). 
14. Royce on Martineau, SR, vol. 2, opposite title page. 
15. Martineau,SR, 1:16; see also 1:1. 
16. See Royce on Martineau, SR, 2: 157; notice, too, how this shift from 
RAP is expressed four years later in SMP, pp. 408-12 and 457-61. 
17. Royce on Martineau, SR, 2: 30. Royce wanted this distinction main-
tained. See, e.g., SGE, p. xiv. 
18. Royce on Martineau, SR, 2: 136; also opposite title page of vol. 2. 
19. See Martineau, SR, 1:215-30, where he admitted encountering 
RAP too late to treat it adequately in his overall plan. Yet in his study of 
theism, he borrowed Royce's phrase, "The World as a Heap of Powers," as 
the title of his fifteen-page treatment of RAP. 
20. Ibid.; quotation from 1:215 (punctuation emended). 
21. See Royce on Martineau, SR, 2:15 7. 
22. Ibid., 1:67, 1:73. 
23. Karl Rahner later paralleled Royce's approach by conceiving time 
and eternity suictly in terms of freedom. For Rahner, "Time is primarily 
the mode of becoming of finite freedom" (Rahner and Herbert Vorgrim-
ler, Theological Dictionary [New York: Herder and Herder, 1965], p. 
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461). Earlier, Augustine's Confessions on time, creation, and salvation 
had preceded this Roycean approach (see bks. 10-12). 
24. Royce on Martineau, SR, 1:258. 
25. Ibid., p. 340. 
26. Royce's 1888 detection and transcription of Martineau's "Alter 
Ego" theme seems significant because, in his later research and writing on 
social consciousness, Royce traced the source of this theme to an appreci-
atively felt contrast effect between ego and alter. This effect would make 
possible the recognition of an "other" as also an "ego," yet an Infinite 
"Alter Ego" as in the present text (see, e.g., SGE, pp. 201, 221). 
Royce's reading of Martineau's critique of Parker perhaps partly explains 
why Royce soon asked Horace E. Scudder to reserve Houghton Mifflin's 
projected volume on Theodore Parker for Royce's then eager and enthusi-
astic pen (see Letters, p. 214). Royce never authored the volume on Parker. 
27. SeeRoyceonMartineau,SR, 2:9,28, 50. 
28. See, e.g., how it expressed itselffour years later in SMP, p. 457. 
29. See Ralph Barton Perry's "Notes on Individual Authors," under 
"Royce," R. B. Perry Papers, Harvard Archives. Besides some notes on WI, 
Perry included in this file nothing else on Royce except the present 1888 
marginal note, which Perry judged significant enough to copy out long-
hand. 
30. Royce on Martineau, SR, 2: 194-95. This notation by Royce is meta-
physically far more profound, organized, and clear than his April 5 sketch 
of "The World as Paradox and Ideal" (see n. 3 above). 
31. Ibid., 2:157. 
32. Ibid. 
33. Martineau, SR, 1:1. 
34. Ibid., 2:229. 
35. Royce on Martineau, SR, 2:229-30 (Royce's emphases). 
36. Milton R. Konvitz, review of The Basic Writings of josiah Royce, 
ed.John]. McDermott, Saturday Review, Jan. 24, 1970, p. 29. 
37. Royce on Martineau, 2:238. 
38. See RAP, pp. 182 and210, with FE, pp. 153 and 191; seeSGE, pp. 
283-84 and 289-90. Compare these with his different "selves" in CG 
(1897), pp. 278-96. 
39. Published in the 1897 edition of CG. 
40. John Dewey later exemplified this position by his a priori "negative 
wall" erected beforehand against any kind of "supernatural" agent. 
41. Royce on Martineau, SR, 2: 136. 
42. Ibid., 2:238-39 (Royce's emphases, but with some punctuation 
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emended). Although in the middle of this text the word "free," in the 
phrase "and so not free," is obscure in the original, "free" best fits the ex-
tant visible traces and the context. 
43. See, e.g.,PC, 1:271-323. 
44. For a fuller Roycean reply, written four years later, see SMP, pp. 
469-71. Guided by it, I interpretatively fill out in the two following para-
graphs the sketch Royce offered in 1888. 
God may permit in his limited choosers such hostility and moral devian-
cy because the True Knower and Supreme Appreciator of moral values is 
radically and mysteriously present within the "immediate vital issue of ev-
ery moment" of choice by finite selves. There he most profoundly estab-
lishes these moral values and directs the process embodying them. In his 
practical knowing of the supreme values, he freely appreciates them and, 
by establishing them, maintains the unity of the moral order amid finite 
choosers. By willing and embodying these values in the moral universe, he 
sets them up as the valid norm for all finite knowing, willing, and doing-
whether true or false. 
The limitations of finite selves-namely, their ultimate moral ignorance 
and partial unholiness-necessarily make this moral world look dark and 
chaotic to such selves. But the finite selves' morally responsible interpreta-
tion of the Infinite Seer, who is known as present, leads them to discern 
the fact that hope in such an Alter Ego is fitting. Hence, transcending the 
limits of their speculative knowledge, they trust in this All-Unifying 
Knower and All-Holy Self. As Royce had written, "My heart is too little 
mine to know. I can only hope. " 
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1. In SMP, we focus particularly on pp. 368-80, guided by Royce's 
own reference to these pages in his letter to Thomas Davidson of March 21, 
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1892 (see Letters, p. 289)-a reference he repeated in SGE, p. 140. Royce 
selected these pages as a summary of his metaphysical idealism. Only it, he 
held, successfully solves the epistemological problem of transcending the 
subjective in knowledge (see SMP, p. xiv). "The Implications of Self-Con-
sciousness" appeared in New World 1 (1892): 289-310; it was reprinted in 
SGE, pp. 140-68, with slight changes. Royce selected this as one of three 
restatements between 1885 and 1898 of his "most essential argument"; 
(see WI, 1: xv). The unpublished entries (37 pp.) of his philosophical jour-
nal under dates of October 31 and December 25, 1888, andJuly 3 and 14, 
1889 also confirm the continuity of his metaphysical speculation. See the 
beginning of chap. 3 above and box E, autograph notebook no. 3, Royce 
Papers, Harvard Archives. 
2. See WI, 1:553-54, n. 1. I base my tentative dating of "around 
1891" for this "insight through Schroeder" on an assemblage of four 
clues. Since Royce reported (ibid.) that this insight first came to him on 
reading Schroeder's first volume, it could not have occurred before 1890, 
the publication date of Algebra der Logik, vol. 1. Secondly, Royce had a 
habit of voraciously reading new scholarly books, especially of this kind. 
Then, too, his 1899 way of referring to this insight suggests it hardly oc-
curred in years recently passed, for in 1899 Royce wrote, "I was years ago 
much struck by the remarkable proof, in the first volume of Schroeder's 
Algebra der Logik" (ibid; emphasis added). Most significantly, however, 
the endless process of self-reflection is already recognizably present in 
Royce's 1892 writings (see SMP, p. 379, and SGE, pp. 145-46). 
3. WI, 1:553-54, n. 1. From these pages the next two quotations are 
derived. 
4. Ibid., 1 :xv, source of the remaining quotations in this paragraph. 
5. Royce to James, May 21, 1888,Letters, p. 216. 
6. SMP, pp. 368-80 (see Letters, p. 289, andSGE, p. 140). 
7. SGE, pp. ixand 140; see Letters, p. 216. 
8. SGE, p. 146. 
9. SeeClendenning'sn. 115 inLetters, p. 216. 
10. SGE, p. 153. 
11. Ibid., p. 141. 
12. Cf. SGE, pp. 142-43, and SMP, pp. 368-70 and 374 with our dis-
cussion above, pp. 31-34. 
13. Letters, p. 216. 
14. SGE, p. 168. Royce here touches a classic theme akin to Augustine's 
argument for eternity in his Confessions, bk. 11, and perhaps akin to Peter 
Berger's discovery of the eternal in play which transcends time (see chap. 3 
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ofhisRumorof Angels, [New York: Irvington, 1969]). I owe the notice of 
this parallel to David]. Hassel, S. J. 
7 
1. See Records of the Bureau of Customs, Record Group 36, National 
Archives, Washington, D.C., as per letter of Mark G. Eckhoff of the Na-
tional Archives and Records Service to the author, September 27, 1967. It 
is as yet undetermined whether Royce first learned in New Zealand that his 
father had died on June 22 or discovered this only upon his arrival in Cal-
ifornia. 
2. See Los Gatos News, August 23, 1888, "A Distinguished Visitor," 
copy reserved in box 1, folder 3, U.C.L.A. Josiah Royce Memorial Collec-
tion. See also the "Tribute to Josiah Royce [senior]," in Los Gatos News, 
August24, 1888. 
3. Royce to James, August 10, 1888, Letters, p. 219. 
4. Royce to Gilman, September 6, 1888, Letters, p. 225. 
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